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ANALYZING THE MULTI-NATIONAL COOPERATIVE 




The JSF program is a cooperative acquisition program involving the U.S. and 
eight partner nations to design, develop, and produce a next-generation fighter. Although 
the program is led by the U.S., the participant nations cooperate to produce an affordable 
yet advanced aircraft by exchanging technology and information, as well as investing in 
the program and receiving commensurate returns. The allied nations will then possess an 
advanced aircraft that they could not afford to develop on their own. Therefore, in order 
to successfully execute this complicated aircraft program, the U.S. has implemented an 
unprecedented acquisition strategy that it envisages as a model for cooperation in future 
international programs. The best value approach, international partners’ early 
involvement, and leveled program participation are salient features of this strategy. 
However, even with innovative approaches and strong management efforts, the 
program’s unit cost has increased 50 percent since 2001, with schedule delays of 2.5 
years. In order to understand this complexity, this report analyzes the JSF program’s 
international cooperative acquisition strategy. Specifically, this report investigates (a) 
whether the JSF acquisition strategy is a useful model for prospective acquisitions, and 
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The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is a cooperative program between the United States 
Department of Defense (U.S. DoD) and eight U.S. allies for developing and producing 
the next generation fighter aircraft to replace their aging inventories.1 The program began 
in November 1996 with a five-year competition between Lockheed Martin and Boeing to 
determine the most capable and affordable preliminary aircraft design. Lockheed Martin 
won the competition, and the program entered system development and demonstration in 
October 2001.2 The program’s purpose is to develop and field an affordable, highly 
common family of stealthy, next-generation strike fighter aircraft for the U.S. Navy, Air 
Force, Marine Corps, and eight U.S. allies. 
The JSF is critical to the ability of the U.S. DoD and its allies to replace their 
aging fighter fleets. The goal is to develop an affordable warfighter that is superior in 
performance to competitors like Euro Typhoon or other fifth generation warfighters and 
to garner a larger market for the U.S. defense contractors. The JSF program is the U.S. 
DoD’s most expensive aircraft program to date. According to official program estimates, 
the total expected investment just for U.S. DoD is now more than 1 trillion dollars—more 
than 300 billion dollars to acquire 2,456 aircraft and 760 billion dollars in life cycle 
operation and support costs.3 
The international partners of this program are the United Kingdom, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Norway. These nations are 
                                                 
1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Cooperative Program Needs 
Greater Oversight to Ensure Goals Are Met,GAO-03-775, (Washington DC:GAO, July 21, 2003), 1, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03775.pdf. 
2 U.S. Government Accounting Office, DoD Plans to Enter Production before Testing Demonstrates 
Acceptable Performance, GAO-06-356, (Washington DC: GAO, March 2006), 3, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06356.pdf. 
3 United States Government Accountability Office, Joint Strike Fighter: Accelerating Procurement 
before Completing Development Increases the Government's Financial Risk, GAO-09-303, (Washington 
DC: GAO, March 12, 2009), 1, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09303.pdf. 
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contributing funds for system demonstration and development, so they have signed the 
agreements to procure a minimum of 730 aircraft. Israel and Singapore are security 
cooperation participants, and several other nations have reportedly expressed interest in 
acquiring aircraft.  
In addition to obtaining cutting edge technology aircraft, the various participants 
in the JSF program have different purposes and expectations related to their involvement. 
The U.S. expects to reduce its share of program costs, to acquire access to foreign 
industrial capabilities, and to improve interoperability with allied militaries. Allied 
governments expect to benefit from defined influence over aircraft requirements, to 
improve relationships with U.S. aerospace companies, to acquire access to JSF program 
data/technology, and to benefit from the program through industrial participation.   
The pillars of the program are affordability, lethality, survivability and 
supportability. U.S. DoD decided to implement unprecedented acquisition approaches to 
develop an affordable but highly advanced aircraft. Also, unexampled approaches are 
envisaged as a model for prospective international cooperative acquisitions. The 
dominant features of these approaches are best value acquisition, international partners’ 
earlier involvement to the program, and leveled program participation.  
This study discusses the reasons for international cooperation to the JSF program, 
the unprecedented acquisition approaches, the current status of the program, and whether 
the JSF program’s unexampled acquisition strategy can be a model for prospective 
international cooperative acquisitions.  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the JSF program’s international 
cooperative acquisition strategy. Thus, this research primarily focuses on the international 
cooperative aspects of the JSF program’s acquisition. The research seeks to clarify the 
motives behind cooperation between the U.S. and its partner nations, the benefits and 
drawbacks of the JSF acquisition strategy, and the performance of Turkey in the JSF 
program. The fundamental research question that this study will seek to answer concerns 
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the adaptability of the JSF program’s international cooperative acquisition strategy to 
other prospective acquisitions. This research thus analyzes unique aspects of the program, 
such as the best value approach, leveled participation, and allied nations’ earlier 
involvement to the program. Additionally, research considers the program’s current 
situation and the reasons for cost increases and schedule delays. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Can the JSF program’s acquisition strategy serve as a model for prospective 
international cooperative acquisitions? 
What are the political/military objectives of the JSF program? 
What are the economic objectives of the JSF program? 
What are the technological objectives of the JSF program? 
What are the industrial objectives of the JSF program? 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the JSF program’s acquisition strategy? 
What are the U.S. DoD’s expectations of the JSF program? 
What are the participant nations’ expectations of the JSF program? 
How does Turkey benefit from the program? 
How well does Turkey perform on the JSF subcontracts? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this research is limited to the international cooperative acquisition 
aspects of the program. The study does not analyze or discuss program aspects which 
relate only to the U.S. and do not affect the entire program. The study also forgoes 
country by country analysis of the participant nations’ industrial participation in the 
program.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of this research is limited to literature review of sources related 
to the JSF program. The data concerning the program are derived from the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reports, the U.S. DoD’s Selected Acquisition Reports 
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(SAR), the Congress Research Service (CRS) reports, the JSF program office’s official 
Web site, and the Turkish National Defense Undersecretariat for Defence Industries. 
The data received from the Turkish National Defense Undersecretariat for 
Defence Industries are obtained by the “Turkish Freedom of Information Act” and are 
unofficially translated by the author of this report. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I is an introduction to the topic, “Analyzing the Multi-national 
Cooperative Acquisition Aspect of the Joint Strike Fighter Program.” It provides a basic 
overview of this MBA project, including the purpose of the thesis, the research questions 
to be answered in this project, and the scope and research method to be utilized. 
Chapter II, JSF Program History and Current Status, is a literature review. First, it 
gives detailed information about the program’s origin, history, pillars, definition of the 
requirement, and key performance parameters. Second, the chapter provides detailed 
information about the program’s acquisition details such as timelines, milestones, 
contractors, procurement quantities, and GAO critiques about the program’s acquisition 
strategy. Third, it outlines budget details. Lastly, the chapter presents the allied nations’ 
participation in and expectations of the program.  
Chapter III is titled Analysis of the JSF Program’s International Cooperative 
Acquisition Strategy. This chapter presents an analysis of the motivations behind 
international armaments cooperation, the JSF program’s core objectives, the best value 
acquisition approach, leveled participation, and affordability. 
Chapter IV is titled Turkey and the JSF Program. This chapter presents an 
analysis of Turkey’s motives to participate in the program, its expectations and reactions 
to cost increases, and Turkish companies’ industrial participation in the program.  
Chapter V, Conclusions and Recommendations, provides a summary of the 
findings and makes recommendations based on those findings.  
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II. JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM HISTORY AND 
CURRENT STATUS  
A. GENERAL 
Before analyzing the multinational cooperative acquisition aspect of the JSF 
program, this chapter reviews the relevant literature. The chapter begins with a summary 
of the history of the program since 1993. In order to understand the current status of the 
program, there follows a description of the program, characteristics of the acquisition 
strategy, and current budget details. Finally, the chapter presents a comprehensive review 
of the allied nations’ participation in the program as well as the relationship between the 
allied nations, the U.S., and the contractors. 
The quantitative data related to the cost of the aircraft and the budget details of 
the program are derived from the GAO reports and the U.S. DoD Selected Acquisition 
Reports.   
B. HISTORY OF THE JSF PROGRAM 
In 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin initiated a comprehensive review of the 
United States’ defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and 
foundations. He felt that a department-wide review needed to be conducted "from the 
bottom up" because of the dramatic changes that had occurred in the world as a result of 
the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.4 (Secretary of Defense 
Les Aspin’s review is cited as 1993-Bottom-Up Review [BUR].) The purpose of the 
review was to define a strategy, force structure, and modernization plans for defense 
planning in the post-Cold War era. The BUR found that a number of combat aircraft that 
were the core of its aviation structure and key to the U.S. success in Operation Desert 
Storm were aging and required replacement.5 As a result of the aircraft replacement, the 
                                                 
4 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of Bottom-up-Review, (Washington, DC: DoD, October 1993), 
iii, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA359953&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
5 Ibid, 35–38. 
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BUR produced two important tactical aviation results. The first was to cancel the A/F-X 
and Multirole Fighter (MRF), terminating production of the F-16 after FY 1994 and the 
F/A-18C/D after FY 1997, and proceeding with the F-22 and the F/A-18E/F, albeit at 
reduced quantities. The second was to launch the Joint Advanced Strike Technology 
(JAST) program in order to replace various services’ aging aircraft with cutting edge 
technology aircraft at less cost.6 
The purpose of the JAST was to develop an interoperable next generation aircraft 
as explained in the BUR. The BUR says: 
We will launch a JAST program that focuses on developing common 
components for future engines, avionics, ground support, training, 
munitions, and advanced mission planning. The technologies pursued 
under this program could be used with any future combat aircraft the 
nation decides to build. These common technologies account for the bulk 
of the cost incurred in acquiring and operating aircraft. Different 
airframes, […] are a lesser part of overall aircraft cost. Thus, we are 
aiming for a combat aircraft that, in terms of cost, is 80 percent “joint,” 
although there may be different airframe silhouettes. We believe this will 
significantly reduce development and production cost for the next 
generation of Navy and Air Force aircraft, even if we elect to proceed with 
different airframes.7  
In January 1994, the JAST program office was established to define and develop 
aircraft, weapon, and sensor technology that would support the future development of 
tactical aircraft. The JAST program initiated conceptual design studies with Boeing, 
Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, and Pratt & Whitney. The objective of these studies was 
to define a technology maturation program, but was not focused on flight demonstration 
of a specific aircraft concept. The program subsequently moved from a broad, all-
encompassing program to one that would develop a common family of aircraft to replace 
several aging U.S. and U.K. aircraft.8 
                                                 
6 Eric V. Larson, David T. Orletsky, and Kristin J. Leuschner, The Bottom-Up Review: Redefining 
Post–Cold War Strategy and Forces, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 57, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1387/MR1387.ch3.pdf. 
7 U.S. DoD, Report of Bottom-up-Review, 38. 




In a short time after initiation, some observers criticized the JAST program for 
being a technology-development program rather than a focused effort to develop and 
procure new aircraft. In 1995, in response to congressional direction, the JAST merged 
with an advanced short takeoff and vertical landing (ASTOVL) aircraft development 
program led by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).The new 
program included U.S. Marine Corps and British Navy participation. The name of the 
program was then changed to JSF to focus on joint development and production of a 
next-generation fighter/attack plane.9 One important reason for the merge was the Clinton 
Administration’s conclusion that future budgets could not sustain new aircraft 
development programs for both USAF and the Navy; thus, their projects were merged 
into a single program.10 
The JSF program started in 1994 and proceeded in four phases. The first phase 
was the Concept Demonstration Phase (CDP), and occurred between 1994 and 1996. 
During that phase, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and McDonnell Douglas (the latter teamed 
with Northrop Grumman and British Aerospace) worked on the prospective stealth 
aircraft. The companies competed to design new aircraft which would shape the future of 
U.S. tactical aviation and the U.S. defense industrial base. At the conclusion of this 
phase, the companies proposed three different aircraft designs.11  
The second phase, Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR), occurred 
between 1996 and 2001. On November 16, 1996, two companies, Boeing and Lockheed 
Martin, were chosen to compete for PDRR phase, in which each contractor would build 
and flight-test two aircraft to demonstrate their concepts for three JSF variants.12 The JSF 
                                                 
9 Christopher Bolkcom, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background, Status, and Issues, CRS 
Report RL30563, (Washington DC: CRS, July 18, 2002), 2, 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30563_20020718.pdf. 
10  John A. Tirpak, “Strike Fighter”, Air Force Magazine, Vol. 79, No. 10, (October 1996): 22–28, 
http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1996/October%201996/1096strike.aspx. 
11 Bolkcom, JSF Program: Background, Status, 2002, 2. 
12 Christopher Bolkcom, F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background, Status, 




PDRR phase costs 2.2 billion dollars.13 Pratt & Whitney provided propulsion hardware 
and engineering support for both Boeing and Lockheed Martin's JSF PDRR efforts. In 
addition to the United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, 
Canada, Italy, Singapore, Turkey, and Israel participated in this phase.  
In August 2001, the PDRR phase concluded and the companies’ demonstrators 
were evaluated by the U.S. DoD. On October 26, 2001, the DoD announced the 
Lockheed Martin team the winner of the competition.14 Therefore, the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development Phase (EMD) began, and Lockheed Martin and the 
government representatives signed a contract. While EMD is the official name for this 
phase, it is generally called the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. 
The United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada, 
Italy, and Turkey participated in the SDD phase.  
The last phase is called the Production, Sustainment and Follow on Development 
(PSFD) phase. The participant nations signed contracts to participate in the program in 
2006 and 2007. Its purpose is to cooperatively develop, produce, test, train, and operate 
the JSF aircraft that will enhance the interoperability, survivability, and affordability of 
the participant nations’ forces future forces.15 This phase will continue until the 
conclusion of full production, which is 2034. All SDD phase participant nations have 
participated in the last phase by committing to purchase these aircraft. 
C. DESCRIPTION OF THE JSF PROGRAM 
The purpose of the JSF program (also known as F-35 Lighting II Program) is to 
develop and manufacture cutting edge tactical aircraft variants for the U.S. Air Force, 
                                                 
13 Fighter Planes, Lockheed-Martin X-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) / F-35 Lightning II, 
http://www.fighter-planes.com/info/jsf.htm. 
14 Global Security, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF),, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/budget/fy2001/dot-e/airforce/01jsf.html. 
15 United States Department of Defense, Department of Defense and Canada Sign Next Stage Joint 




Marine Corps, and Navy, as well as eight allied nations and various nations outside of the 
participating group. . The JSF is the U.S. DoD’s largest acquisition program in terms of 
cost and number of aircraft to be produced and the longest in terms of procurement 
duration.16 Current U.S. DoD plans call for production of 2,456 aircraft in three versions 
for the U.S. services and 722 aircraft for cooperative participant nations until 2034. 
1. The Program’s Overall Mission Need 
The JSF is a joint program between the United States and Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. These 
nations have a cooperative agreement to develop and field an affordable next generation 
aircraft. The JSF Program is led by the U.S. and is the U.S. DoD's focal point for defining 
affordable next generation strike aircraft weapon systems for the U.S. Navy, Air Force, 
Marines, and eight allied nations.17  
The purpose of the JSF program is to develop and deploy a family of technically 
superior, lethal, survivable, and supportable but affordable cutting edge and stealth 
aircraft that perform a wide range of missions in a variety of theaters.18  
The JSF is producing aircraft to fulfill the requirement of the U. S. Navy’s first 
day of war, survivable strike fighter aircraft, the U.S. Air Force’s multirole aircraft 
(primary-air-to-ground), the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.K.’s Short Takeoff/Vertical 
Landing (STOVL) aircraft, and other nations’ Conventional Takeoff and Landing 
(CTOL) aircraft.19 The overall design developed by Lockheed with partners Northrop 
Grumman and BAE Systems resembles a scaled-down F-22, but each F-35 variant is 
                                                 
16 Christopher Bolkcom and Anthony Murch, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background, 
Status, and Issues, CRS Report RL30563, (Washington DC: CRS, August 29, 2008), 1, 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA486544&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
17 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program Office, The JSF Program, http://www.jsf.mil/program. 
18 U.S. Government Accounting Office. Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint Strike Fighter 
Program with Different Acquisition Strategy, GAO-05-271, (Washington DC: GAO, March 2005), 4, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05271.pdf. 
19 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program Office, The JSF Program, http://www.jsf.mil/program/. 
10 
 
tailored to the specific needs of its operators.20 The F-35A is developed for the U.S. Air 
Force, the F-35C for the U.S. Navy, and the F-35B for the U.S. Marines and the United 
Kingdom.21 The three types of aircraft are designed to have maximum commonality in 
airframe, engine, and avionics components to reduce development, production, and 
operation and support costs. The F-35 types, requesting services/nations, and planned 
using purposes can be seen in Table 1. 
Service F-35 Type Planned Use 
U.S. Air Force F-35A- (CTOL) Replacement for the F-16 and A-10; complement the F/A-22 
U.S. Marine 
Corps F-35B- (STOVL) Replacement for the AV-8B and F/A-18 A/C/D 
U.S. Navy F-35B- (STOVL),F-35C- (CV) Complement the F/A-18 E/F 
United 
Kingdom F-35B- (STOVL),  Harrier GR7, Sea Harrier FA2 
Australia F-35A- (CTOL) Replacement for the F-111, F/A-18 
Canada F-35A- (CTOL) Replacement for the  F/A-18 
Denmark F-35A- (CTOL) Replacement for the F-16 
Italy F-35A- (CTOL), F-35B- (STOVL), 
Replacement for the  AMX, Harrier, AV-8B 
and Tornado 
Norway F-35A- (CTOL) Replacement for the F-16 
Netherlands F-35A- (CTOL) Replacement for the F-16 
Turkey F-35A- (CTOL) Replacement for the F-16 
 
Table 1. Military Services’ Planned Use for the Joint Strike Fighter. Source: GAO 
Report, GAO-06-356, 5. 
2. Pillars of the JSF Program 
                                                 
20 Aircraft Museum, Description of F-35, http://www.aerospaceweb.org/aircraft/fighter/f35/. 
21 Bolkcom and Murch, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, 3. 
11 
 
The JSF program has four pillars. The program seeks to produce lethal, 
survivable, and supportable but affordable aircraft. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program 
Office’s Web page gives details of each of these pillars. The F-35s will attain the 
following.22 
a. Affordability 
The primary focus of the program is affordability, decreasing the 
development cost, production cost, and ownership cost of the variant F-35 aircraft. The 
Web page of the JSF program strongly emphasizes the program’s vision as “delivering 
and sustaining the most advanced, affordable strike fighter aircraft to protect future 
generations worldwide.”23 
The contractors are trying to achieve the affordability goal by developing 
and producing a high level of common parts and systems across the three versions of the 
aircraft.  
b. Lethality 
Every F-35 variant will be highly effective in both air-to-ground precision 
strikes in all weather and air-to-air combat engagements. The F-35 will be extremely 
lethal. It will have excellent aerodynamic performance and advanced integrated avionics. 
Its next generation stealth, superb situational awareness and reduced vulnerability will 
make the F-35 hard to find, hard to hit, and hard to kill. 
c. Survivability 
As a stealthy (radar-evading), high-performance, supersonic strike fighter, 
the F-35 successfully integrates the technologies that will make every mission more 
survivable. 
 
                                                 
22 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program Office, F-35 Background, 
http://www.jsf.mil/f35/f35_background.htm. 




The F-35 will set new standards for both reliability and maintainability, 
enabling lower support costs and easier upgrades compared to legacy aircraft. 
3. Definition of the Requirement 
The F-35 is one of the first fifth generation aircraft in the world, combining 
advanced stealth, sensor fusion, fighter agility, network-centric capability, and 
dramatically reduced support costs.24 With its host of next-generation technologies and 
unprecedented capabilities, the F-35 will be far and away the world’s most advanced 
multi-role fighter.25 All JSF models will be single-seat, single engine aircraft with 
supersonic dash capability. Also, the F-35 is designed to be self-sufficient or part of a 
multisystem and multiservice operation, and to rapidly transition between air-to-surface 
and air-to-air missions while still airborne.26 
Contrary to some misconceptions that the JSF would be one aircraft used by 
several services for different missions, the program focused on the development and 
production of three variants with common components and a common design.27 These 
are known as F-35A, F-35B, F-35C. The details are: 
• F-35A- Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL): The F-35A uses 
standard runways for takeoffs and landings. It is a multirole, supersonic stealth fighter 
that has extraordinary acceleration and 9-g maneuverability with F-16-like agility.28 The 
F-35A is designed for the U.S. Air Force and its cooperative allies; it is the primary 
export version of the Lightning II.  
                                                 
24 The Aerospace Web page provides a useful definition of fifth generation fighters: The technologies 
that best epitomize fifth generation fighters are advanced integrated avionics systems that provide the pilot 
with a complete picture of the battlespace and the use of low observable "stealth" techniques. The F-22 and 
F-35 are the only fifth generation fighters developed to date. 
25 Aviation Spectator, F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter: Aircraft profile, 
http://www.aviationspectator.com/resources/aircraft-profiles/f-35-lightning-ii-joint-strike-fighter-aircraft-
profile. 
26 U.S. Government Accounting Office. Opportunity to Reduce Risks, GAO-05-271, 4–5. 
27 Bolkcom, F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, 2009, 3. 




• F-35B- Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing (STOVL): The F-35B is the 
first aircraft in history to combine stealth with short takeoff/vertical landing capability 
and supersonic speed. This distinction gives the F-35B the unique ability to operate from 
small ships, roads, and austere bases. The F-35B deploys near front-line combat zones, 
dramatically shrinking the distance from base to target, increasing sortie rates and 
decreasing the need for logistics support.29 
• F-35C- Carrier Variant (CV): The U.S. Navy’s first stealth aircraft 
operates from the service’s large carriers via catapult launch and arrested recovery. 
Larger wings and control surfaces and the addition of wingtip ailerons allow the F-35C 
pilot to control the airplane with precision during carrier approaches. The aircraft 
incorporates larger landing gear and a stronger internal structure to withstand the forces 
of carrier launches and recoveries. Ruggedized exterior materials mean low maintenance 
requirements for preserving the aircraft’s Very Low Observable radar signature, even in 
harsh shipboard conditions.30 Pictures and short descriptions of the three versions of the 
















                                                 
29 Lockheed Martin, F-35B STOVL Variant, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/f35/f-35-
variants/f-35b-stovl-variant.html. 





Conventional Take Off & Landing (CTOL) 
Span (ft) 35 
Length (ft) 50.5 
Wing Area (ft2) 460 
Internal Fuel (lb) 18,498 
Short Take Off/Vertical Landing (STOVL) 
Span (ft) 35 
Length (ft) 50.5 
Wing Area (ft2) 460 
Internal Fuel (lb) 13,326 
Carrier Variant (CV) 
Span (ft) 43 
Length (ft) 50.8 
Wing Area (ft2) 620 
Internal Fuel (lb) 19,624 
Figure 1. Variants of the F-35. Source: www.jsf.mil. 
 
4. General Technological Characteristics of the F-35s 
Development of the F-35 family, which will be used by the U.S.’s three services 
and eight allies for different combat missions, requires cutting edge technology. To 
achieve its mission, JSF will incorporate low observable technologies, defensive 
avionics, advanced onboard and offboard sensor fusion,
 
internal and external weapons, 





technologies represent a quantum leap over legacy tactical aircraft capabilities.31 The 
general technological characteristics of the aircraft, taken from the official F-35 Program 
Office’s Web page, are depicted below.32 
Autonomic Logistics (AL): As logistics support accounts for two-thirds of an 
aircraft's life cycle cost, the F-35 will achieve unprecedented levels of reliability and 
maintainability, combined with a highly responsive support and training system linked 
with the latest in information technology. The aircraft will be ready to fight anytime and 
anyplace. AL is a seamless, embedded solution that integrates current performance, 
operational parameters, current configuration, scheduled upgrades and maintenance, 
component history, predictive diagnostics (prognostics) and health management, and 
service support for the F-35. 
Commonality: Commonality is the key to affordability—on the assembly line; in 
shared-wing platforms; in common systems that enhance maintenance, field support, and 
service interoperability; and in almost 100 percent commonality of the avionics suite. 
Component commonality across all three variants reduces unique spares requirements 
and the logistics footprint. In addition to reduced flyaway costs, the F-35 is designed to 
affordably integrate new technology during its entire life cycle. According to a 
Congressional Research Report, the contractors have designed these three distinct 
variants of a multi-role fighter with a 70 percent to 90 percent common airframe to 
reduce production and maintenance costs.33 
Interoperability: The F-35 will have the most robust communications suite of 
any fighter aircraft built to date. The F-35 will be the first fighter to possess a satellite 
communications capability that integrates beyond line of sight communications 
                                                 
31 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Management of the Technology Transfer Process, GAO-06-
364, (Washington DC: GAO, March 2006), 3, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06364.pdf. 
32 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program Office, F-35 Technology, 
http://www.jsf.mil/f35/f35_technology.htm. 
33 According to the Lockheed Martin’s Web page, “all F-35 versions are built on the same assembly 




throughout the spectrum of missions it is tasked to perform. The F-35 will also contain 
the most modern tactical datalinks, which will provide the sharing of data among its 
flight members as well as other airborne, surface, and ground-based platforms required to 
perform assigned missions. The commitment of JSF partner nations to common 
communications capabilities and Web-enabled logistics support will enable a new level 
of coalition interoperability. These capabilities allow the F-35 to lead the defense 
community in the migration to the net-centric warfighting force of the future. 
Low Observability: An integrated airframe design, advanced materials, and an 
axisymmetric nozzle maximize the F-35's stealth features. 
Sophisticated Cockpit: The F-35 provides its pilot with unsurpassed situational 
awareness, positive target identification, and precision strike under any weather 
condition. Mission systems integration and outstanding over-the-nose visibility features 
are designed to dramatically enhance pilot performance. 
Robust Structure: The F-35 features a strengthened continuous tailhook-to-nose-
gear structure and catapult-compatible nose gear launch system for catapult and arresting 
loads. 
Weapons Integration: The F-35 will employ a variety of U.S. and allied 
weapons. From JDAMs to Sidewinders and the UK Storm Shadow, the F-35 has been 
designed to internally or externally carry a large array of weapons. 
Helmet Mounted Display System: Vision Systems International, LLC (VSI) is 
developing the most advanced and capable Helmet Mounted Display System (HMDS) for 
the F-35. Utilizing extensive design experience gained on successful production of 
Helmet Mounted Displays (HMD), the F-35 HMDS will replace the traditional Head-Up-
Display (HUD) while offering true sensor fusion. 
Distributed Aperture System: In a joint effort with Lockheed Martin Missiles 
and Fire Control, Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems will provide key electronic 
sensors for the F-35, including spearheading the work on the Electro-Optical Distributed 
Aperture System (DAS). This system will provide pilots with a unique protective sphere 
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around the aircraft for enhanced situational awareness, missile warning, aircraft warning, 
day/night pilot vision, and fire control capability. 
Diverterless Inlet: The F-35's diverterless inlet lightens the overall weight of the 
aircraft. Traditional aircraft inlets were comprised of many moving parts and were much 
heavier than newer diverterless inlets. The diverterless inlet also eliminates all moving 
parts. 
Electro-Optical Targeting System: Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control 
and Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems are jointly providing key electronic sensors 
for the F-35 to include the Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS). The internally 
mounted EOTS will provide extended range detection and precision targeting against 
ground targets, plus long range detection of air-to-air threats. 
Integrated Communications, Navigation and Identification Avionics: 
Northrop Grumman Space Technology's integrated avionics satisfy the requirements for 
greatly increased functionalities within extreme space and weight limitations via modular 
hardware that could be dynamically programmed to reconfigure for multiple functions. 
This "smart"-box approach delivers increased performance, quicker deployment, higher 
availability, enhanced scalability, and lower life cycle costs. 
Multi-Function Display System: Rockwell Collins's 8"x20" Multi-Function 
Display System (MFDS) will be the panoramic projection display for the F-35. MFDS 
employs leading edge technology in projection engine architecture, video, compression, 
illumination module controls, and processing memory – all of which will make the 
MFDS the most advanced tactical display to date. One-gigabyte-per-second data 
interfaces will enable the MFDS to display six full motion images simultaneously. The 
adaptable layout will be easily reconfigurable for different missions or mission segments. 
Projection display technology will provide a high-luminance, high-contrast, and high-
resolution picture with no viewing angle effect. 
Multi-Mission Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar: Northrop 
Grumman Electronic Systems is developing the AESA Radar for the F-35. This advanced 
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multi-function radar has gone through extensive flight demonstrations during the Concept 
Demonstration Phase. The radar will enable the F-35 JSF pilot to effectively engage air 
and ground targets at long range, while also providing outstanding situational awareness 
for enhanced survivability. 
Propulsion: Two separate, interchangeable F-35 engines are under development: 
the Pratt & Whitney’s F135 and the General Electric (GE) Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine 
Team’s F136. Although the Pratt & Whitney’s (P&W) F135 engine was selected as the 
basis for the various engine options of the JSF, in 1995 the U.S. Congress indicated a 
need for an "Alternate Engine" as a backup plan. The GE Rolls-Royce F136, inspired 
from the F-22 Raptor’s engine F-120 that was in competition with the P&W’s F119, was 
selected as the alternate engine for F-35s and is under development in collaboration with 
GE Rolls-Royce.34 The Pratt & Whitney (F135) and the GE Rolls-Royce (F136) Fighter 
Engine Team engines are physically and functionally interchangeable across all F-35 
aircraft and their autonomic logistics systems. Both engines bring key benefits to the JSF 
aircraft: cooperative development in which common propulsion system components are 
used to minimize development costs, a wide range of options to meet individual customer 
requirements, and sharing of propulsion support equipment to simplify maintenance of 
either engine.35 
4. Key Performance Parameters of the Program 
The F-35A has six key performance parameters (KPPs) that address total 
ownership costs; these KPPs are also applicable to the F-35B and F-35C. The joint KPPs 
are: interoperability, radio frequency signature, combat radius, sortie generation rate, 
logistics footprint, and mission reliability. Short take-off distance and vertical lift bring 
back KPPs are unique to the F-35B and maximum approach speed KPPs are unique to the 
F-35C. The details of KPPs are listed in Table 2. 
                                                 
34 Greg Goebel, The Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), 
http://www.vectorsite.net/avf35.html. 





Table 2. JSF Key Performance Parameters. Source: Bolkcom, F-35 Lightning II 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, 3. 
D. THE JSF PROGRAM ACQUISITION DETAILS 
The JSF is a joint, multinational acquisition program for the Air Force, Navy, 
Marine Corps, and eight international partners. It is also the largest and most expensive 
weapons system currently in development in terms of cost and amount of production and 
program longevity. The program’s goals are to develop and field an affordable, highly 
common family of stealthy, next-generation strike fighter aircraft for the U.S. Navy, the 
Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the U.S. allies.36 
1. Program Timeline and Milestones 
The JSF program proceeded in four phases; the years 1994-1996 are called the 
Concept Development Phase (CDP), the first phase of the program.  
                                                 
36 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain, 
GAO-07-360, (Washington DC: GAO, March 2007), 1, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07360.pdf. 
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The second phase was the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR). This 
phase began in November 1996 with a 5-year competition between Lockheed Martin and 
Boeing to determine the most capable and affordable preliminary aircraft design. 
Lockheed Martin won the competition, and this phase concluded in October 2001. The 
third phase was the Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase (EMD), which 
began in October 2001.37 This phase planned to conclude in 126 months, April 
2012,38but is rescheduled to conclude in 2014. The milestones of the JSF program can be 
seen in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Milestones of the JSF Program. Source: GAO Report, GAO-09-326SP, 
93. 
The program is currently in the eighth year of the SDD phase. During the SDD 
phase, the Lockheed led team is required to build 14 flying development aircraft (five F-
35As, four F-35Bs, five F-35Cs) and eight non-flying full-sized articles.39 Flight testing 
is being carried out at Edwards Air Force Base, California, and Naval Air Station, 
Patuxent River, Maryland.40 
Until 2003, system integration efforts and a preliminary design review revealed 
significant airframe weight problems that affected the aircraft’s ability to meet key 
performance requirements. Weight reduction efforts were ultimately successful but 
                                                 
37 EMD is more official name for this phase; mostly it is called System Development and 
Demonstration Phase (SDD). 
38 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program Office, JSF EMD Solicitation Documents, Call for Improvement: 
Section F- Deliveries and Performance, http://www.jsf.mil/downloads/down_documentation.htm. 
39 Bill Sweetman, Ultimate Fighter:Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, (St Paul, MN:Zenith 
Press, 2004), 98. 




increased the cost of the program and caused schedule delays.41 In April 2003, JSF 
completed a successful preliminary design review (PDR).42 But in March 2004, the DoD 
rebaselined the JSF program, the program schedule extended by 18 months, and the 
development cost increased by 7.5 billion dollars.43 
The critical design reviews (CDR) for the F-35A and F-35B were completed in 
February 2006, and for the F-35C in June 2007. The first flight of the CTOL F-35A took 
place on December 15, 2006, and the first flight of F-35C is planned in December 2009. 
The F-35B flew in conventional mode in June 2008, but the full capacity flight was 
rescheduled to September 2009. The initial operational capability is scheduled for March 
2012 for the U.S. Marine Corps with F-35B, March 2013 for the U.S. Air Force with F-
35A, and March 2015 for the U.S. Navy with F-35C.44   
Low-rate initial production (LRIP) for the F-35A and F-35B was approved in 
April 2007 with an order for two F-35A aircraft. The U.S. DoD procured two aircraft in 
2007 and 12 aircraft in 2008. Currently, the program is under low-rate production and 
aircraft testing. So far, two percent of the test has been concluded, and 28 aircraft will 
cumulatively be procured by the U.S. DoD by the end of 2009.45 By the completion of 
operational testing in October 2014, the U.S. DoD will have purchased a total of 383 
aircraft. The completion of operational testing and full rate production outset are planned 
for October 2014.  
The initial operation test and evaluation (IOT&E) phase is a subset of the SDD 
phase, allowing contributing nations to participate in this phase. Participating nations are 
                                                 
41 U.S. Government Accounting Office. Joint Strike Fighter: Impact of Recent Decisions on Program 
Risks,  GAO-08-569T, (Washington DC: GAO, March 11, 2008), 4, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08569t.pdf. 
42 SPG Media Naval Technology, F-35 Lightning II - Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), USA, 
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/jsf/. 
43 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Impact of Recent Decisions, GAO-08-569T, 4. 
44 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Joint Strike Fighter: Strong Risk Assessment Essential as 
Program Enters Most Challenging Phase, GAO-09-711T, (Washington DC: GAO, May 20, 2009), 18, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09711t.pdf. 
45 Ibid, 15. 
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to sign up during the IOT&E phase MOU in 2009.46 In October 2008, Italy announced 
that it intended to withdraw from participation in the IOT&E.47 
Details of the program schedule, original estimate, 2004 replan, and current 
estimate are given in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. F-35 JSF Schedule. Source: GAO Report, GAO-09-711T, 18. 
The fourth phase is called the Production, Sustainment and Follow-on 
Development (PSFD) phase. During this phase, production, testing, and fielding of the 
aircraft is taking place concurrently. The phase began in 2007 after the participant nations 
signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This phase is scheduled to continue 
until 2034. Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom signed the 
MOUs for the F-35 Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development (PSFD) phase 
at the end of 2006. Norway, Turkey, Denmark, and Italy signed the MOUs at the 
beginning of 2007.48  
                                                 
46 Bolkcom, F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, 2009, 9. 
47 SPG Media, Naval Technology, F-35 Lightning II - Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), USA, 
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/jsf/. 




The engine programs have followed a different timeline. In October 2001, Pratt & 
Whitney was awarded the contract to develop the engine F135. In August 2005, the GE 
Rolls-Royce Team was awarded a contract to develop an alternate engine program, the 
engine F136. In 2010 and 2011, Pratt & Whitney and the GE Rolls-Royce Team will be 
awarded noncompetitive contracts. But after 2012, one of the engines will be selected 
annually under a competitive approach. In 2007, Pratt & Whitney was awarded the first 
of the annual production contracts.49 The first flight of the F-35 powered by the GE 
Rolls-Royce F136 engine is scheduled for 2010, with first production engine deliveries in 
2012. A critical design review was completed in February 2008.50 
2. Program Dollar Value 
a. Dollar Value of the JSF Air System Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development Program 
On October 26, 2001, the U.S. DoD declared that it was awarding 
Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas, an 
18,981,928,201 dollars cost-plus-award-fee contract for the Joint Strike Fighter Air 
System EMD program. The principal objectives of this phase are to develop an affordable 
family of strike aircraft and an autonomic logistics support and training system. 
According to the U.S. DoD’s contract winner declaration at the DoD’s Web page, 66 
percent of the work would be performed in Fort Worth, Texas, 20 percent of work would 
be performed in El Segundo, California, and 14 percent of work would be performed in 
Warton/Samlesbury, United Kingdom, and was expected to be completed in April 2012. 
This contract was competitively procured through a limited competition; the other 
competitor was Boeing.51 
                                                 
49 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Impact of Recent Decisions, GAO-08-569T, 4. 
50 SPG Media, Naval Technology, F-35 Lightning II - Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), USA, 
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/jsf/. 




Lockheed Martin’s cost-plus-award-fee contract calls for a potential award 
fee of almost 2.83 billion dollars, or 15 percent of the total contract value. The exact 
amount of the fee is determined by the program office, based on mostly subjective 
criteria related to Lockheed Martin’s ability to achieve development and unit cost control, 
program management, and technical development goals and milestones.52 
According to the JSF Program Office, so far the current estimated cost for 
this phase is 46.8 billion dollars. In addition to this 46.8 billion dollars, 9.8 billion dollars 
is required to conclude the development in October 2014.53  
a. Dollar Value of the JSF Engine Development Program 
On October 26, 2001, the U.S. DoD also awarded Pratt & Whitney the 
Joint Strike Fighter Air System Engineering and Manufacturing Development Program. 
Pratt & Whitney, Military Engines, East Hartford, Connecticut, was being awarded a 
4,803,460,088 dollars cost-plus-award-fee contract for the design, development, 
fabrication and test of the F135 propulsion system and common hardware as necessary to 
complete ground testing and demonstrate conformance with specification requirements; 
the fabrication of propulsion systems for Joint Strike Fighter air system flight testing; and 
the fabrication of common hardware for the General Electric aircraft engine F136 
Propulsion System Flight Test Program.  
The Web page of the U.S. DoD states that the JSF engine development 
program contract provided for system test and evaluation; propulsion system program 
management; F135 integration management; engine interchangeability and common 
hardware integration management for the F133 propulsion system; repair development; 
support system design; development and implementation; a training and training 
equipment program; shipping system and module container design and delivery; flight 
test spare and repair parts; flight test support for F136 Propulsion System Program Phases 
                                                 
52 U.S. General Accounting Office, JSFn: Cooperative Program Needs Greater Oversight to Ensure 
Goals Are Met,GAO-03-775, 24. 
53 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Strong Risk Assessment Essential, GAO-09-711T, 3. 
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III and IV; and technical, administrative, and financial data. Also, the Web page stated 
that 72 percent of the work would be performed in East Hartford, Connecticut; 16 percent 
in Middletown, Connecticut; one percent in West Palm Beach, Florida; and 11 percent in 
the United Kingdom (subcontractor—Rolls Royce) and was expected to be completed in 
April 2012.54 
 On August 19, 2005, the GE Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine team was 
awarded a 2,466,258,499 dollars cost-plus-award-fee and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for 
the Joint Strike Fighter F136 System Development and Demonstration (SDD) Program. 
The U.S. DoD’s contract award declaration stated that this contract provided for 
continued efforts required to meet SDD Program’s milestones and mitigate technical, 
schedule, and cost risk, resulting in the delivery of six flight test engines to Lockheed 
Martin. Fifteen percent of the contract work will be done in The United Kingdom, and 85 
percent will be done in the United States. The work should be completed in September 
2013.55 
According to a GAO report published in 2008, the current estimated life 
cycle cost for the JSF engine program under a sole-source scenario (just Pratt & 
Whitney’s cost) is 54.9 billion dollars. Furthermore, a GAO report published in 2007 
states that to ensure competition by continuing to implement the JSF alternate engine 
program, an additional investment of 3.6 billion dollars to 4.5 billion dollars may be 
required.56 The details of Pratt & Whitney’s cost details from the 2008 GAO report are 
featured in Table 4. 
 
                                                 
54 U.S. Department of Defense, October 26, 2001 Contract Awards List, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=2131. 
55 U.S. Department of Defense, August 22, 2005 Contract Awards List,  
http://www.defenselink.mil/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=3077. 
56 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Analysis of Costs for the Joint Strike 





Table 4. Cost to Complete Pratt & Whitney F135 Engine Program. Source: GAO 
Report, GAO-08-569T, 11. 
3. Estimated Procurement Quantities 
In October 2001, the U.S. DoD planned to procure 2866 aircraft for its services. 
But in 2004, during the rebaseline work, the procurement amount was decreased to 2455 
aircraft (13 aircraft for development plus 2443 aircraft procurement until 2034). 
In 2006 and 2007, during the PSFD participation process, the participant nations 
also committed to buy aircraft. Australia committed to buy 100 aircraft, Canada 80, 
Denmark 48, Italy 131, the Netherlands 85, Norway 48, Turkey 100, and the United 
Kingdom 138. In total, the participant nations will buy 730 aircraft before 2034. The 
estimated year by year JSF aircraft procurement quantities of the participants are depicted 






































Australia 0 0 0 0 4 8 15 15 15 15 15 13 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 16 16 16 16 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 8 8 8 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 14 14 14 14 14 
Netherlands 0 0 1 1 0 6 10 10 12 12 12 12 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 12 12 12 4 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 12 12 10 10 
U.K. 0 0 2 1 0 6 1 8 11 12 13 12 
U.S. 2 12 16 30 43 82 90 116 130 130 130 130 
Total 2 12 19 32 47 118 132 205 230 231 230 219 
 
Continued 



















Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 
Denmark 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48 
Italy 12 12 12 12 1 0 0 0 0 0 131 
Netherlands 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 85 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48 
Turkey 10 10 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 
U.K. 12 7 2 1 1 12 13 13 11 0 138 
U.S. 130 130 130 130 130 127 80 80 80 515 2443 
Total 181 159 150 143 132 139 93 93 91 515 3173 
 
Table 5. Participants’ Estimated JSF Aircraft Procurement Quantities (April 2007 
Revision). Source: www.jsf.mil.   
4. Prime Contractors 
 An international cooperative team, shaped in accordance with the requirements of 
the JSF program and led by Lockheed Martin, heads development, production, and 
support of the F-35s. Northrop Grumman Cooperation and British Aerospace Electronic 
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Systems are principal subcontractors on an F-35 industry team led by main contractor 
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics. The engine program’s (F135) contractor is Pratt & 
Whitney, while the alternative engine program’s (F136) contractor is General Electric 
(GE) and Rolls Royce Cooperation.  
a. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company 
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company is the prime contractor for the    
F-35 JSF program. Along with the government-operated JSF Program Office, the 
company bears ultimate responsibility for the aircraft and all of its systems. Lockheed 
Martin benefited from cooperation by Northrop Grumman Corporation and British 
Aerospace Electronic Systems, as well as many more subcontractors and suppliers across 
the United States and around the globe. Lockheed Martin is engaged in the design, 
oversight, and support of every major F-35 subsystem. The company is also responsible 
for producing the F-35’s forward fuselage, wings, and edges, which will be mated to the 
center fuselage (Northrop Grumman) and the aft fuselage and tails (BAE SYSTEMS) in 
Fort Worth, Texas. 57 
b. Northrop Grumman Corporation 
As a principal member of the Lockheed Martin team, Northrop Grumman 
plays a key role in the development and demonstration of the family of F-35s.58 Northrop 
Grumman provides and develops low-observable/stealth technology. In addition to 
providing support in logistics, sustainment, modeling, simulation, and mission planning, 
Northrop Grumman provides: 
• Design and integration of the center fuselage, 
• Mission systems software components, 
• Ground and flight test support, 
                                                 
57 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program Office, Lockheed Martin’s Role in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
Program, http://www.jsf.mil/downloads/down_mediakits.htm. 




• Fire control radar, 
• Electro-optical distributed aperture system, 
• Integrated communications, navigation, and identification avionics 
suite.59 
The company is building an international F-35 supplier team focused on 
providing “best value” to its customers. To date, the company has awarded some of its 
most significant subcontracts to firms based in partner countries, including an agreement 
to produce at least 400 center fuselages in Turkey starting in the low rate initial 
production phase of the program.60 
c. British Aerospace Electronic (BAE) Systems (United Kingdom) 
BAE Systems is a prime contractor from the United Kingdom. According 
to the JSF Program Office’s Web page, this company brings a rich heritage of capabilities 
to the JSF program, including short takeoff and vertical landing experience, advanced 
lean manufacturing, flight testing, and air system sustainment. In both the United 
Kingdom and the United States, British Aerospace Electronic Systems designs and 
develops:   
• Aft fuselage and empennage (tails and fins), 
• Electronic warfare systems,  
• Vehicle management computer,  
• Navigation and identification modules, 
• Pilot side-stick controller and throttle. 
BAE Systems is also responsible for the fuel, crew escape, life-support, 
Prognostics and Health Management systems, and the U.K.’s Future Carrier F-35 
integration support.61  
                                                 
59 Lockheed Martin, F-35 Lightning II, The Future is Flying, 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/data/assets/aeronautics/products/f35/A07-20536AF-35Broc.pdf. 
60 Northrop Grumman Cooperation, F-35A Lightning II (CTOL),  
http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/f35jsf_ctol/index.html. 




d. Pratt & Whitney 
On October 26, 2001, the U.S. DoD awarded a ten year, 4.8 billion dollar 
(U.S.) contract for the SDD phase to Pratt & Whitney.  Under the SDD contract, Pratt & 
Whitney is developing the F135 propulsion system through flight clearance, flight test, 
and qualification for LRIP.  The first LRIP deliveries are scheduled for 2009.62 
The JSF acquisition strategy requires the development of two propulsion 
systems. The Pratt & Whitney’s engine competes, in production, with one developed by 
the team of General Electric and Rolls Royce. The P&W and GE/RR engines will be 
physically and functionally interchangeable in both the aircraft and support systems. All 
JSF aircraft variants will be able to use either engine. The competition will start in fiscal 
year 2011 and will continue through the life of the program to reduce risks.63 According 
to Lockheed Martin, the interchangeable engines will provide:  
• Cooperative development in which common propulsion systems 
components are used to minimize development cost, 
• Wide range of options to meet individual customer requirements, 
• Sharing of propulsion support equipment to simplify maintenance 
of either engine.64 
A GAO report published in 2004 states that Rolls Royce (located in the 
United Kingdom) and Hamilton Sundstrand are major subcontractors to Pratt & Whitney 
for this effort. In addition to the F135 engine, Pratt & Whitney is also responsible for 
developing certain common propulsion system components that will interface with both 
engine cores.65 
                                                 
62 Pratt & Whitney, F-135Background-System Development and Demonstration, 
http://www.f135engine.com/media-center/backgrounder.shtml. 
63 U.S. Department of Defense, October 26, 2001 JSF Contact Award Immediate Release, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3129. 
64 Lockheed Martin, F-35 Lightning II, The Future is Flying,  
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/data/assets/aeronautics/products/f35/A07-20536AF-35Broc.pdf. 
65 U.S. General Accounting Office. Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Observations on the Supplier 
Base, GAO-04-554, (Washington DC:GAO, May 3, 2004), 4, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04554.pdf. 
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e. GE Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team (The Fighter Engine 
Team) 
 The Fighter Engine Team was created in July 2002 by General Electric 
and Rolls-Royce, and formed for the development, deployment, and support of the F136 
engine for the JSF program.66 The engine F136 is one of the two primary propulsion 
systems for F-35 aircraft. The GE Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team includes: GE 
Transportation - Aircraft Engines in Cincinnati, Ohio, USA; and Rolls-Royce plc in 
Bristol, England, and Indianapolis, Indiana, USA. GE is developing 60 percent of the 
program, and Rolls Royce is developing 40 percent.67 
 In August 2005, the DoD awarded a 2.47 billion dollar contract for 
alternate engine system development and demonstration to the GE Rolls Royce Team.68 
The team plans to deliver the first F136 engine in 2011.69 
5. Procurement Method Used 
The JSF’s procurement method was contracting by negotiation in keeping with 
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). The government conducted discussions in 
accordance with FAR 15.306 and requested proposal revisions in accordance with FAR 
15.307. 
F-35 solicitation proceeded as a limited competition between two major aircraft 
producers, Lockheed Martin and Boeing. After Lockheed Martin’s selection for 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development, Boeing was eliminated and ceased work 
on the JSF program. A ‘winner takes all’ strategy was implemented. 
                                                 
66 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Impact of Recent Decisions,GAO-08-569T, 4. 
67 General Electric Aviation, Model 136 Joint Strike Fighter Engine, 
http://www.geae.com/engines/military/f136/index.html. 
68 U.S. Department of Defense, August 22, 2005Contract Awards List, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=3077. 
69 GE Aviation, Joint Strike Fighter Engine, http://www.geae.com/engines/military/f136/index.html. 
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The government intended to conduct a negotiated competition and desired to 
select one offer based on the proposal providing the "best value" to the government, all 
factors considered.70 
6. Type of Contract and Contract Incentives 
The U.S. DoD used a COST-PLUS-AWARD-FEE contract for the SDD phase. 
The total available award fee is 15 percent of the contract. Award fee categories are 
affordability, management, and technical and developmental cost control.  
According to FAR Part 16.305, a cost-plus-award-fee contract is a cost-
reimbursement contract that provides for a fee consisting of: 
• A base amount (which may be zero) fixed at inception of the contract, 
• An award amount, based upon a judgmental evaluation by the 
government,  
• Sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in contract performance.  
According to the definition of cost-plus-award-fee in FAR Part 16.405-2, a cost-
plus-award-fee provides for a fee consisting of a base amount fixed at the inception of the 
contract and an award amount that the contractor may earn in whole or in part during 
performance. That is sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in such areas as 
quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity, and cost-effective management. The amount of 
the award fee to be paid is determined by the government’s judgmental evaluation of the 
contractor’s performance in terms of the criteria stated in the contract.  
According to FAR 16.405-2, the cost-plus-award-fee contract is suitable for use 
when: 
• The work to be performed is such that it is neither feasible nor effective to 
devise predetermined objective incentive targets applicable to cost, 
technical performance, or schedule; 
                                                 
70 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program Office, Call for Improvement, JSF EMD Solicitation Documents, 
Section-M, Evaluation Factor for Award, (Washington D.C.:DoD, 2001), 1, http://www.jsf.mil/downloads/. 
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• The likelihood of meeting acquisition objectives will be enhanced by 
using a contract that effectively motivates the contractor toward 
exceptional performance and provides the government with the flexibility 
to evaluate both actual performance and the conditions under which it was 
achieved; 
• Any additional administrative effort and cost required to monitor and 
evaluate performance are justified by the expected benefits.71 
The U.S. DoD chose the cost-plus-award-fee contract type to motivate the 
contractors for excellence in such areas as quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity, and 
cost-effective management and bear the risk of an innovative contract. The award fee 
evaluation covers the Award Fee Categories set forth in Table 6: 
 
Award Fee Category: Area of Emphasis: 
Affordability:  
Reduction in development, production, and ownership 
cost, 
Affordability Assessment Process (Contract Award 
through CDR), 





Subcontract Management (includes small business 
utilization) 
Technical:  
Air System Development, 




Actual Contract Performance 
Table 6. JSF Contract Award Fee Categories. Source: JSF EMD Solicitation 
Documents, www.jsf.mil. 
                                                 




7. GAO Critiques and Recommendations on the JSF Acquisition 
Strategy 
Between 2005 and 2009, the GAO insistently recommended two major 
modifications on the JSF acquisition strategy. The first was to have an evolutionary and 
knowledge-based acquisition approach and the second was to switch the cost-plus-award-
fee to a fixed-price contract.  
a. Have an Evolutionary, Knowledge-based Acquisition Strategy 
Since 2005, the GAO has released five reports (GAO-09-303, GAO-08-
388, GAO-07-360, GAO-06-356, GAO-05-271) expressing concern about the substantial 
overlap of development, test, and production activities and recommended a more 
evolutionary and knowledge-based acquisition strategy with limited investment in 
production aircraft until each variant demonstrates required capabilities in flight 
testing.72 
According to the GAO reports, the DoD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of 
the Defense Acquisition System, and best practices all call for programs to use an 
acquisition strategy that reflects an evolutionary, knowledge-based approach. This 
approach ensures that appropriate technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge are 
captured at key milestones before committing to increased investments. As seen in The 
Defense Acquisition Management Framework (Figure 3), the advancement to each step 
requires fulfillment of the current step or milestone.  
                                                 





Figure 3. Defense Acquisition Management Framework. Source: DoD Instruction 
5000.2: Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. 
However, as seen in Figure 4, the JSF program has a concurrent 
acquisition approach in which the technology development phase overlaps with the initial 
system development and system development overlaps with low-rate initial production. 
Contrary to DoD Instruction 5000.2, the U.S. DoD has a current commitment to procure a 
large quantity before 2013 (273 aircraft, 11 percent of the total procurement), before 
system development and testing have been completed. This move significantly increases 
the risk of further delays and cost increases due to design changes and manufacturing 
inefficiencies.73 Thus, the U.S. DoD bears the financial risk of concurrently developing 
and initially producing the JSF on a cost reimbursement basis with the prime contractor, 
an uncommon practice for such a large number of units, until the design and 
manufacturing processes are mature.74 
 
                                                 
73 U.S. Government Accounting Office, DoD Plans to Enter Production, GAO-06-356, 1–2. 




Figure 4. Joint Strike Fighter Program Acquisition Strategy. Source: GAO Report, 
GAO-06-356, 14. 
b. Switch to Fixed-Price Contract  
In 2001, the U.S. DoD preferred to have a cost-plus-award-fee contract for 
the SDD phase of the program. Currently, the U.S. DoD is acquiring a substantial number 
of aircraft on this contract. Because of cost reimbursement contracts, the buyer, in this 
case the DoD, assumes most of the risk. Thus, the buyer is liable to pay more than 
budgeted should labor, material, or other incurred costs be more than expected when the 
contract was signed.75 For that reason, the GAO recommends that the DoD switch to a 
fixed-price contract. However, JSF officials plan to procure at least the first four low-rate 
production lots under cost reimbursement contracts and to transition to fixed-price 
instruments when appropriate, possibly between lots five and seven (fiscal years 2011 to 
2013). The latest GAO report points out the issue as:  
Cost reimbursement contracts provide for payment of allowable 
incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract. According 
to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, cost reimbursement 
contracts are suitable for use only when uncertainties involved in 
contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with 
sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed price contract.  Cost 
                                                 
75 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Accelerating Procurement, GAO-09-303, 12–13. 
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reimbursement contracts for weapon production are considered 
appropriate when the program lacks sufficient knowledge about 
system design, manufacturing processes, and testing results to 
establish firm prices and delivery dates. In contrast, a fixed-price 
contract provides for a pre-established price, places more of the 
risk and responsibility for costs on the contractor, and provides 
more incentive for efficient and economical performance.76  
As seen in Figure 5, to date, the U.S. DoD has procured the first two low-
rate production lots for a total of 14 aircraft and 3.6 billion dollars on cost reimbursement 




Figure 5. Overlap of Procurement Investment and Flight Testing. Source: GAO 
Report, GAO-O9-711T, 15. 
E. THE JSF PROGRAM BUDGET DETAILS 
1. Funding and Projected Cost 
The JSF program is the U.S. DoD’s costliest aircraft acquisition program.77 The 
GAO currently estimates that the total cost of development and procurement of 2,456  
 
 
                                                 
76 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Accelerating Procurement, GAO-09-303, 13. 
77 U.S. Government Accounting Office. Tactical Aircraft: DoD Needs a Joint and Integrated 




aircraft will run 300 billion dollars, and that the life cycle and support cost will be over 
760 billion dollars; thus the JSF program will cost the U.S. DoD more than one trillion 
dollars.78 
At the start of the JSF program in November 1996, the U.S. DoD planned to acquire 
2,988 aircraft, expected first aircraft delivery in 2007, and expected initial operation in 2010. 
At the outset of the program in October 2001, the U.S. DoD was planning to purchase 2866 
aircraft at a total acquisition cost of 233 billion dollars; the first delivery was to occur in 2008 
while the initial operation would take place in 2010-2012.  
At the end of 2003, the U.S. DoD reduced total aircraft numbers to 2,457. The 
estimated total acquisition cost increased to 244.80 billion dollars and the expected first 
delivery and the initial operation were delayed to 2009 and 2012–2013, respectively.79  
According to the latest GAO report, the U.S. DoD is planning to buy 2,456 aircraft at 
an estimated total acquisition cost of 298.8 billion dollars. The current expected first 
operational aircraft delivery year is 2010, and the initial operational capability is to occur in 
2012-2015. 
Overall, the cost estimate to develop the JSF has increased from 34.40 billion 
dollars in 2001 to 44.40 billion dollars in 2007, about 29 percent. According to the JSF 
Program Office, the current estimated cost for this phase is 46.8 billion dollars. In 
addition to this 46.8 billion dollars, 9.8 billion dollars is required to conclude the 
development by October 2014.80  
The program acquisition unit cost (PAUC) of the aircraft was estimated as 81 
million dollars in 2001, 100 million dollars in 2003, and 122 million dollars now. PAUC 
has increased 50 percent since the beginning of the development phase.  
Details of cost increases, schedule overruns, and the program’s evolution are 
depicted in Table 7: 
                                                 
78 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Accelerating Procurement, GAO-09-303, 1. 
79 Allied nations signed agreements to procure minimum of 730 aircraft.  




Table 7. Changes in JSF Program Purchase Cost, Quantities, and Delivery 
Estimates. Source: GAO Report, GAO-09-303, 5. 
                                                 
81 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Progress Made and Challenges Remain, GAO-07-360, 5. (The 
























2978 2852 2443 2443  2443 
Total 
Quantities 2988 2866 2457 2458 2456 
Cost Estimates (then year dollars in Billions)   
Development* $24.80 $34.40 $44.80 $44.50  $44.40 
Procurement  Not available $196.60 $199.80 $231.70  $254.00 
Military 
Construction Not available $2.00 $0.20 $0.20 $0.50  
Total Program 
Acquisition  Not available $233.00 $244.80 $276.40 $298.8 
Unit Cost Estimates (then year dollars in Millions)   
Program 
Acquisition  Not available $81.00 $100.00 $112.00  $122.00 
Average 
Procurement Not available $69.00 $82.00 $95.00  $104.00 


















2. The Evolution of the JSF Program Cost Estimates on the Selected 
Acquisition Reports    
A review of the Selected Acquisition Reports demonstrates the extent of budget 
increases since 2001. The summaries of budget increase amounts and reasons as 
explained in the program Selected Acquisition Report’s since 2001 are summarized 
below. 
2001—Development costs increased 7,904.2 million dollars (+3.6 percent) from 
218,554.1 million dollars to 226,458.3 million dollars, due primarily to delay of the SDD 
phase decision, extension of the SDD phase from a 90-month to 126-month effort 
employing a block approach, a refined cost estimating model with a more detailed work 
breakdown structure, and addition of two flight test aircraft to the program. As a result of 
the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) Milestone B approval, the program entered 
into the SDD phase in October 2001, and 196,600 million dollars of procurement for 
2,866 production aircraft has been added to the SAR.82 
2002—Program costs decreased by 26,721.9 million dollars (-11.8 percent) from 
226,458.3 million dollars to 199,736.4 million dollars, due primarily to a decrease of 409 
Navy aircraft (from 2,866 to 2,457 aircraft) (-25,434.9 million dollars).83 
2003—Program costs increased 45,097.9 million dollars (+22.6 percent) from 
199,736.4 million dollars to 244,834.3 million dollars, due primarily to revised contractor 
direct labor and overhead rates, the SDD phase schedule extension for additional design 
maturation, a delay in procurement start from FY 2006 to FY 2007 with revised annual 
quantity profiles, and learning curve impacts of revised SDD and production schedules 
on contractors.84 
                                                 
82 U.S. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), 
2001 December Selected Acquisition Reports, (Washington DC: December 31,2001), 10–11,  
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/2001-Dec-SARSUMTAB.pdf. 
83 U.S. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), 
2002 December Selected Acquisition Reports, (Washington DC: December 31, 2002), 8, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/SARST1202.pdf. 
84 U.S. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), 




2004—Program costs increased 11,783.3 million dollars (+4.8 percent) from 
244,834.3 million dollars to 256,617.6 million dollars, due primarily to increases for 
application of revised escalation indices, design maturation, refined definitions of support 
requirements, and a delay in initial procurement from FY 2007 to FY 2008 with a revised 
buy profile for all variants.85 
2005—Program costs increased 19,841.3 million dollars (+7.7 percent) from 
256,617.6 million dollars to 276,458.9 million dollars, due primarily to the increased cost 
of materials for the airframe, revised inflation impact assumptions and methodology, 
revised assumptions regarding the work share between the prime contractor and 
subcontractors, the application of revised escalation rates, impact of configuration update 
and methodology changes on support, a change in the subcontracting manufacture plan 
for the wing, and a realignment of funding to out years due to Congressional and Service 
FYDP reductions (+130.0 million dollars).86 
2006—Program costs increased by 23,365.2 million dollars (+8.5 percent) from 
276,458.9 million dollars to 299,824.1 million dollars, due primarily to a decrease in the 
annual procurement quantities, a stretch out of the production buy schedule from FY 
2027 to FY 2034, and support increase due to aircraft configuration update, revised 
procurement profile, and methodology changes.87 
2007—Program costs decreased by 981.3 million dollars (-0.3 percent) from 
299,824.1 million dollars to 298,842.8 million dollars, due primarily to the application of 
                                                 
85 U.S. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), 
2004 December Selected Acquisition Reports, (Washington DC: December 31, 2004), 8–9, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/2004-DEC-SST.pdf. 
86 U.S. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), 
2005 December Selected Acquisition Reports, (Washington DC: December 31, 2005), 9, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/2005-DEC-SARSUMTAB.pdf. 
87 U.S. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), 




revised escalation indices, lower material estimates because of prime contractor’s 
material agreements, and incorporation of revised prime/subcontractor labor rates.88 
Summary of the JSF program’s current estimates of cost, quantity changes, and 
average unit cost changes are depicted in Table 8. 
 
Current Estimate 
















Dec 2001  226,458.3 2886 78.47  +3.6 
Dec 2002 161,543.9 199,736.4 2,457 81.29 1.4 -2.8 
Dec 2003 191,632.9 244,834.3 2,457 99.65 20.3 19.1 
Dec 2004 192,519.0 256,617.6 2,458 104.40 20.8 24.8 
Dec 2005 201,729.4 276,458.9 2,458 112.47 26.6 34.5 
Dec 2006 209,401.60 299,824.10 2,458 121.98 30.2 44.4 
Dec 2007 210,014.50 298,842.80 2,456 121.68 30.6 44.0 
Sep 200889 210,014.50 298,842.80 2,456 121.68 30.6 44.0 
 
Table 8. F-35 JSF Selected Acquisition Reports Summary- Base Year 2002 
Average unit cost increased drastically between December 2002 and December 
2006. The cost increase can be seen in Figure 6.  
 
                                                 
88 U.S. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), 
2007 December Selected Acquisition Reports, (Washington DC: December 31, 2007), 6, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/2007-DEC-SARSUMTAB.pdf. 
89 U.S. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), 




Figure 6. F-35 Average Unit Cost Estimate 
F. ALLIED NATIONS’ PARTICIPATION AND EXPECTATIONS 
1. Purpose and Cooperative Framework 
The F-35 JSF program is unquestionably one of the most unique and interesting 
programs in defense acquisition history in many aspects. Interesting and unique features 
include international participation, its antecedents and history, the project organization, 
and the responses by the many national and corporate participants. It is also interesting 
because of its potential effects on defense industries worldwide.90 Jon A. Schriber, 
former JSF International Programs Director, explains the uniqueness of the program: 
It is unprecedented to have international involvement in a major U.S 
fighter development acquisition program not only this early in the 
development effort, but also during a critical competitive phase of the 
program. While other U.S. aircraft programs, such as the F-16 Program, 
have successfully involved international partners, it has been at a much 
later phase. The JSF has the opportunity to draw on the lessons learned 
from past programs as well as on-going cooperative development and 
production programs […].91  
                                                 
90 Raymond Franck, Ira Levis, and Bernard Udis, Echoes Across the Pond: Understanding EU-US 
Defense Industrial Relationships, (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 59. 
91 Jon A. Schreiber, JSF International Business Strategy,  NATO’s Nations and Partner for Peace, 
(November 2002), 164. 
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As mentioned before, the JSF program, the world’s largest and most expensive 
development program to date is a cooperative program between the U.S. DoD and eight 
U.S. allied-nations for developing and manufacturing fifth generation fighter aircraft to 
replace aging inventories. The participant nations are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 
Commonly, the program is conceived as an international acquisition program 
meant to attract financial investment and technological innovation from partner countries, 
as well as to partner early with governments whose military services will likely be users 
of this state-of-the-art coalition forces platform.92 The F-35 Lightning II aircraft brings 
new capability to the air forces, but also serves as a centerpiece for international 
cooperation.93 
The JSF Program does not only involve cooperation between the U.S. government 
and the government of its allies’, but also leads to cooperation between prime contractors 
and the allies’ industrial partners. The governments’ relationship structure was 
established through a framework Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that identifies 
the roles, responsibilities, and expected benefits for all participants.94 The relationship 
between prime contractor and international subcontractors were structured by agreements 
and licenses. The International Strategy/Cooperative Framework of the program is 
depicted in Figure 7: 
                                                 
92 U.S. Department of Defense, JSF International Industrial Participation: A Study of Country 
Approaches and Financial Impacts on Foreign Suppliers, (Washington, DC.: DoD, June 2003), 2, 
 http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/jsf_international_industrial_participation_study.pdf. 
93 Unites States Air Force, F-35 Centerpiece for International Partnership, September 28, 2006, 
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123028145. 




Figure 7. JSF International Strategy/Cooperative Framework. Source: Steven L. 
Enewold, “Joint Strike Fighter Program Briefing,” June 8, 2004. 
The U.S. and participant nations have different expectations of the JSF program. 
A GAO report asserts that the U.S. expects to benefit from sharing program costs, 
gaining access to foreign industrial capabilities, and improving interoperability with 
allied militaries once the aircraft is fielded. The report points out that the participant 
nations expect to benefit through defined influence over aircraft requirements and 
improved industrial relationships with U.S. aerospace companies through access to JSF 
contractors and subcontracting competitions.  The report also states that a major benefit 
for partners is having their personnel physically located within the program office with 
access to program information and contractor data.95 
The report further points out that the JSF program contributes to the U.S.’s 
armaments cooperation policy. The purpose of the armament cooperation is to increase 
military effectiveness through standardization and interoperability and to reduce weapons 
acquisition costs by avoiding duplication of development efforts with U.S. allies. The JSF 
program supports the policy in the following areas: 
                                                 
95 U.S. General Accounting Office, Joint Cooperative Program Needs, GAO-O3-775, 1–2. 
46 
 
• Political/military: expanded foreign relations, 
• Economic: decreased JSF program costs from partner contributions, 
• Technical: increased access to the best technologies of foreign partners,  
• Operational: improved mission capabilities through interoperability with 
allied systems.96 
2. International Participant Phases and Levels 
Rather than representing a full co-development effort, the JSF program could be 
characterized as a U.S.-led program with significant foreign outsourcing at the second 
and third tiers.97  
Unlike previous defense acquisitions, the first cooperative partner participated in 
the program at the JSF program definition and risk reduction phase in 1996 (even the 
U.K. had participated in 1995). Then, until 2002, other cooperative partners participated 
in the program’s SDD phase. Joining the JSF program as level one, two, and three 
partners in the SDD phase was only possible until July 15, 2002. Partner nations were 
able to withdraw from participation at any time during this phase.98 The last phase of the 
program’s international aspect is PSDF, and current participant partners entered in the 
program in 2006 and 2007. A summary of the international program progress is depicted 
in Figure 8: 
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Figure 8. JSF International Program Progression. Source: Steven L. Enewold, “Joint 
Strike Fighter Program Briefing”, June 8, 2004. 
a. Concept Demonstration Phase Participation (Program Definition 
and Risk Reduction Phase)99 
The United Kingdom became a full collaborative partner in the program in 
1995. Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada, and Italy subsequently joined the 
program as cooperative partners. Singapore, Turkey, and Israel are foreign military sales 
participants for this phase.100 There were four levels at which participants joined the JSF 
program: 
• Level I - Full collaborative partner: the United Kingdom was the 
only participant at this level, committing 200 million dollars for the CDP. The U.K. is 
thus entitled to full access to program data and structure, as well as the ability to 
influence requirement definitions and performance characteristics.  
• Level II - Associate partner: Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
Norway formed a group and paid a total of 30 million dollars to participate at this level. 
These nations are entitled to limited access data and limited requirement influence.  
                                                 
99 Keijsper, Lockheed F-35, 257–259.  
100F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program Office. JSF History, http://www.jsf.mil/history/his_f35.htm. 
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• Level III - Informed partner: Canada and Italy participated in this 
level by paying 10 million dollars each. They are entitled to limited access to program 
information and representation, but have no influence on requirements.  
• Level IV - Foreign military sale partner: Turkey, Singapore, and 
Israel participated at this level. They are entitled only to negotiate directly with the 
program office about cost, operational performance, and modeling and simulation 
studies.  
b. System Development and Demonstration Phase Participation 
The cooperative nations participated in the program’s system development 
and demonstration phase in three levels based on their financial contributions. Through 
their participation levels, the participant nations proportionately benefited from the 
program, including the number of staff representing them in the program office, access to 
program data and technology, and membership on management decision-making bodies. 
The last available data suggest that participant nations’ financial contributions are over 
4.5 million dollars or 10 percent of that times system development and demonstrations 
phases cost.101 The advantage of joining the SDD phase was the ability to withdraw 
without financial penalty. Participation in the SDD phase allowed partner nations to 
compete for contracts on a “best value” basis.102 The allied nations’ financial 
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United Kingdom Level  I $2,056 4.96 138* 4.3 
Italy Level  II $1,028 2.48 131 4.1 
Netherlands Level  II $800 1.93 85 2.7 
Turkey Level  III $175 0.42 100 3.2 
Australia Level  III $144 0.33 100 3.2 
Norway Level  III $122 0.29 48 1.5 
Denmark Level  III $110 0.27 48 1.5 
Canada Level  III $100 0.24 80* 2.5 
Partners  $4,535 10.93 730 23.0 
United States  $36,946 89.07 2,443 77.0 
Total  $41,481 100.0 3,173 100.0 
Table 9. JSF Partner Financial Contributions and Estimated Aircraft Purchases. 
Source: GAO Report, GAO-06-364, 4. 
c. Production, Sustainment and Follow on Development Phase 
The last phase for participation was the sustainment and follow on 
development phase. The Netherlands, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom 
participated in this phase in 2006, while Turkey, Norway, Italy, and Denmark 
participated in 2007. In the PSFD phase, the participant nations committed to buying 
aircraft. If a nation reverses its decision to purchase the aircraft after participation in this 
phase, it could be penalized financially.103  
Unlike the SDD phase, the PSFD phase does not offer levels for 
participant nations. In signing the PSFD Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the 
nations gave details of their procurement plans, including the type of aircraft, numbers of 
aircraft requested, and timeline for purchasing. The governance structure of the program 
                                                 
103 Keijsper, Lockheed F-35, 259. 
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has broadened to allow all participating nations to have a voice in follow-up development 
decisions. In contrast to the SDD phase, the phase costs will here be divided in a “fair-
share” manner based on the proposed purchase amount of the respective nation. Also, 
unlike the bilateral SDD MOUs, PSFD is an agreement among all partner nations.104  
d. Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) 
The IOT&E phase is a subset of the SDD phase. The cooperating nations 
are invited to participate in this subpart phase in 2009.105 The U.K., Italy, and the 
Netherlands have agreed to participate in the IOT&E program. The U.K. will have the 
strongest participation in the IOT&E phase. Other partner nations have not yet 
determined their participation in this phase. The benefits to participation are expedited 
acquisition of aircraft, pilot training for the test cycle, and access to testing results.106  
e. Best Value Acquisition Approach 
However, unlike other international cooperative programs, the JSF 
program does not guarantee foreign or domestic suppliers a predetermined level of work 
based on a country’s financial contribution to the program and does not assign any 
traditional offset arrangements.  Instead, foreign and domestic suppliers generally bid 
competitively for JSF work.107 The best value approach is used to describe that 
competitive acquisition approach. 
To qualify for participation in the bidding process for JSF subcontracts, 
international and domestic industrial partners must demonstrate world-class products and 
technologies representing cost advantages to the program. Once Lockheed Martin and its 
top-tier partners have chosen a supplier, they will pursue sole source contracts with these 
companies based on schedule, performance, and cost benchmarks. If the suppliers do not 
                                                 
104 Bolkcom, F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, 2009, 9. 
105 SPG Media, Naval Technology, F-35 Lightning II - Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), USA, 
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/jsf/. 
106 Bolkcom, F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, 2009, 11. 




meet these benchmarks, they open themselves to re-competition.108 Participant nations’ 
motives behind SDD participation, major keys to government approaches, and the 








Major Key to 
Government Approach 
to JSF Program  
Main Concerns with 









Italy  Operational requirement  
Worked with Lockheed 
Martin to develop 
industry support  
US contracting practices 
unfamiliar, Lengthy 
TAA approvals  
Netherlands  Industrial benefit  
"Public - Private 
Partnership" 
US sub-tiers unwilling 
to source work to global 
suppliers, Lengthy TAA 
approvals  
Canada  Industrial benefit  
Pro-active "JSF Canada" 
organization "Strategic Sourcing" 
Norway  Industrial benefit  
Teaming with other 
partner countries to 
increase competitiveness  
US top tier contractors 
favor established 
suppliers  
Denmark  Operational requirement  
Liaison between Danish 
industry and Lockheed 
Martin and sub-
contractors  
Large companies often 
absorb upfront 
development costs  
Australia  Operational requirement  
Government liaison 
between Australian 
industry and program 
IPTs  
Export regulations -
TAAs and GPA  
Turkey Industrial benefit 
MOD liaison between 
industry and Lockheed 
Martin  
Lack of communication  
Table 10. Summary of Country Strategies and Concerns. Source: U.S. DoD, JSF 
International Industrial Participation, 13. 
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3. The JSF Program International Industrial Participation109 
In June 2003, the U.S. DoD issued a study (cited above) that analyzed the 
motivations behind participant nations’ industrial participation, their concerns, and the 
program’s financial impact. To understand the nations’ concerns and expectations, a 
summary of the study’s findings are attached below:  
a. The United Kingdom 
Key Features of Government Approach: 
• Royal Air Force/Navy operational requirements are the key reason 
for JSF participation. 
• Early involvement in the program has helped U.K. firms to gain 
entry to the program. 
• The U.K. government and industry are committed to best value 
strategy; the government trusts industry to fight for work while it acts to ensure a “level 
playing field.” 
Concerns: 
• Lack of disclosure of technical information has potential to limit 
industrial competitiveness. 
• The international nature of JSF exposes the U.K. to potential risks, 
particularly cost impacts of U.S. reprogramming or Congressional intervention via “Buy-
America” legislation. 
Financial Impact: 
• Incremental earnings attributable to JSF work will likely run well 
into the billions in U.S. dollars over the life of the program, bringing great vitality to 
U.K. industry, 
• Nominal return on investment is likely to be very high, perhaps 
exceeding 21 dollars for every dollar of direct program investment over the life of the 
program. 
                                                 
109 U.S. Department of Defense, JSF International Industrial Participation, 16–70. 
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Primary Reasons for Participation 
• To meet operational requirements of RAF and the Royal Navy, 
• To achieve operational commonality with the United States, 
• To achieve an affordable Air System through economies of scale. 
b. Italy 
Key Features of Government Approach: 
• Air Force/Navy operational requirements are the key reason for 
JSF participation. 
• Italian JSF investment (1.028 billion dollars) is funded by the 
Ministry of Defense, with support from Ministry of Productive Activities, 
• Lockheed Martin-Italian Ministry of Defense LOIs and MOU 
outlining expected JSF participation with Italian industry preceded Parliamentary 
approval. 
Concerns: 
• Late commitment to SDD might have limited potential Italian 
contract wins. 
• Italy believes that several issues have impaired their SDD 
participation on a “level playing field” basis. 
• Italian industry has been upset by short RFP response times, and is 
stunted by a lack of familiarity with the “best-and-final-offer” concept (no interim 
negotiations) – both standard US contracting practices. 
• Limited effectiveness of GPA has forced firms into lengthy TAA 
processes. 
Financial Impact: 
• Italy will likely see a nominal return of over 476 percent on their 






Primary Reasons for Participation 
• Italian Air Force & Italian Navy requirement for future tactical 
fighters, 
• To facilitate Italian industrial participation in JSF program. 
c. The Netherlands 
Key Features of Government Approach: 
• During CDP, JSF was selected by the Dutch government as one of 
two aircraft platforms upon which to build the Dutch aerospace industry of the future. 
• Early (1997) financial support from the Dutch government to 
Dutch industry promoted JSF participation. 
• A Public-Private Partnership (PPP) provided government 
sponsorship of SDD investment in exchange for a 3.5 percent tax on all Dutch JSF 
production and support revenues in order to repay SDD investment. 
• JSF CDP and SDD efforts are led by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, with key input by industry, MoD, and the Royal Netherlands Air Force. 
• The Dutch JSF organization intended to act as a “first responder” 
contact with Lockheed Martin and other JSF contractors and an “enabler” of business 
relationships for Dutch industry; however, it was unable to prevent two non-compliant 
bids. 
Concerns: 
• Dutch companies feel that they cannot compete on a “level playing 
field” with American counterparts due to geographic, financial, export control, and 
security of supply limitations. 
• The Dutch Parliament’s early concerns related to return on 
investment is a constant threat to future participation in JSF program. 
Financial Impact: 
• The Netherlands is expected to earn a nominal return on their SDD 




Primary Reasons for Participation 
• To use JSF as the military aircraft platform upon which the Dutch 
aerospace industry would be technically based for the future, 
• To evaluate JSF as a potential replacement for F-16. 
d. Canada 
Key Features of Government Approach: 
• The Department of National Defense and Industry Canada took the 
lead in championing Canadian participation in the JSF program through the innovative 
organizational structure of “JSF Canada.” 
• JSF Canada pro-actively sought opportunities for Canadian 
industry by meeting with major JSF contractors and surveying the Canadian industrial 
base.  
• Canada hopes to foster best value performance on a global scale 
through partnerships with other JSF countries. 
Concerns: 
• “Strategic sourcing” may damage the credibility of best value 
programs in future Canadian parliamentary debates on JSF and other programs that are 
similarly structured, e.g., Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft. 
• Canada’s ITAR exemption has not been used, which has created 
delays in obtaining clearances to access technical RFP information. 
Financial Impact: 
• Canada will likely see an annual compounded rate of return on 
their SDD investment greater than 75 percent over the life of the JSF program. 
• Technical knowledge gained through SDD is expected to fuel 
future earnings through “spin off” products. 
• The “JSF supplier” label will boost earnings from other programs 
due to marketing appeal. 
Primary Reasons for Participation 
• To facilitate Canadian industrial participation in the JSF program, 
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• To evaluate JSF as a potential candidate for the Canadian Forces, 
• To promote interoperability between U.S., U.K., and Canadian 
militaries, 
• To gain insight into U.S. procurement methodologies and best 
practices. 
e. Norway 
Key Features of Government Approach: 
• Potential industrial benefits spurred initial involvement in CDP; 
potential operational requirements surfaced later. 
• Government/industry groups formed to look at the overall 
industrial implications of defense programs. 
• Norwegian government is not organized to assist industry in 
winning JSF work. 
• Norway is forming international partnerships with Canada and 
Denmark. 
Concerns: 
• Norway lacks a “level playing field,” as Lockheed Martin and their 
first tier subs tend to favor pre-existing supplier relationships. 
• Lockheed Martin’s new “Strategic Sourcing” plan is not the 
answer. 
Primary Reasons for Participation 
• To facilitate Norwegian industrial participation in JSF program, 
• To evaluate JSF as a potential Norwegian Air Force purchase. 
f. Denmark 
Key Features of Government Approach: 
• Denmark is hoping to leverage its relationship with Lockheed 
Martin and its prior F-16 program experience to win JSF contracts. 
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• Denmark possesses strong industrial support, including co-funding 
of SDD investment. 
• Denmark believes that the primary benefit to program participation 
is in acquiring a replacement platform for its current F-16 fleet. 
• Political opposition has forced Danish defense suppliers to lobby 
for JSF program participation. 
• Danish industry and government officials have worked diligently 
to organize marketing opportunities for Danish defense companies and capabilities. 
Concern: 
• In the best value contracting process, larger companies often 
absorb upfront development costs in order to under-price and eliminate competition, 
allowing them to capture windfall profits during production phases. 
Primary Reasons for Participation 
• To replace current the F-16 fleet with F-35 aircraft, 
• To support the Danish defense industry, 
• To gain understanding of the F-35 platform and program. 
g. Australia 
Key Features of Government Approach: 
• Australia is taking a combined government-industry approach to 
maximize opportunities for Australian industry within the best value model. 
• Australia has formed a JSF program office to coordinate both the 
industry and capability aspects of the project. 
• Australia has created a JSF industry team to help maximize 
opportunities for national industry. 
• Australia is looking to team with U.S. companies and companies from 






• Australia has been unable to bid on some JSF contracts due to the 
lengthy TAA execution process. 
• Australian companies sometimes face difficulty competing against 
larger U.S. and Canadian companies that may subsidize their JSF programs in the SDD 
phase. Australia believes that strategic sourcing contracts will help overcome this 
somewhat, but is still very much in favor of the best value arrangements. 
Primary Reasons for Participation 
• To facilitate Australian industrial participation in JSF, 
• To evaluate JSF as a potential platform for Australian forces. 
h. Turkey 
Key Features of Government Approach: 
• The Turkish MoD chose to become a partner in the JSF program in 
order to support its defense industry and eventually replace its fleets of F-4s, F-5s, and F-
16s. 
• The MoD is working to bring together respective points of contact 
in the Turkish defense industry and JSF contractors. 
• The Turkish government provides development funds to 
financially support companies that secure JSF opportunities. 
Concern: 
• Until a recent meeting with senior Lockheed Martin and DoD 
officials, Turkey believed that it lacked information on the complete universe of available 
JSF contracts. As communication has since improved, Turkey believes that it is now 
better positioned to capitalize on its position as a JSF partner-level participant. 
Primary Reasons for Participation 
• Positive effect on industry in terms of increased revenues, jobs, 
and technological expertise, 




This chapter reviews literature relevant to the multi-national cooperative 
acquisition aspect of the JSF program. The review is highly concentrated on literature 
pertaining to the acquisition strategy and budget details of the program as well as 
participation by allied nations. However, while there is much literature concerning the 
JSF program, there is only one study regarding allied nations’ industrial participation in 
the program. This study was prepared by the U.S. DoD in June 2003, and titled “JSF 
International Industrial Participation: A Study of Country Approaches and Financial 
Impacts on Foreign Suppliers.” 
U.S. DoD and GAO studies have consistently estimated similar cost and budget 
figures; however, there is inconsistency between cost and budget timing. The DoD’s 
2005 and 2006 cost and budget estimates match the GAO’s 2006 and 2007 cost 
estimates, respectively. For example, the DoD’s 2005 estimate is 276.4, and the GAO’s 
2006 estimate is 276.4. 
All studies and reports agree on the cost increase and schedule delays. As 
mentioned in the budget section, affordability is one of the pillars, but since 2001, the 
unit cost of the aircraft has increased by roughly 50 percent. Also, full production outset 
was planned for 2012 in 2001, but the program schedule has been delayed by two years 
and is now rescheduled for 2014. 
As mentioned in the DoD’s studies of the allied nations’ industrial participation in 
the program, multi-national cooperation effectively mitigates the burden of cost for 
individual nations, but has also resulted in unprecedented problems such as technology 
transfer and ineffective bidding on subcontracts. In summary, all participant nations have 
different expectations and concerns.  
After reviewing the program’s history, acquisition strategy, budget details, and 
issues of international participation, the next chapter analyzes the acquisition aspect of 
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE JSF PROGRAM’S INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATIVE ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
The JSF program is the largest and most expensive international design, 
development, production, and procurement program in the history of the U.S. DoD, and 
for that matter, the world. According to GAO reports, the JSF program’s procurement 
volume is 3173 aircraft (2443 aircraft for the U.S. and 730 aircraft for eight allied 
nations). Currently, the estimated average acquisition unit cost of F-35s is 121.60 million 
dollars; the estimated total acquisition cost is over 386 billion dollars. According to the 
last assessment made in 2007, the estimated life cycle cost is more than 1 trillion dollars 
just for the U.S. DoD. As the numbers demonstrate, the JSF program is not only critical 
to the U.S. and its eight allied nations’ future force structures and military capabilities, 
but is also critical to all world defense industrial bases.  
The main purpose of the JSF program is to replace U.S. and its allies’ aging 
aircraft with affordable, lethal, supportable, and stealth fifth generation aircraft. In 
addition to gaining a superior aircraft, the U.S. and its eight allies expect to realize a 
variety of benefits from this international cooperation program. The U.S. expects to 
defray the development and production cost, to benefit from nations’ aerospace 
technology and experience for the high technology aircraft in its Navy, Air Force, and 
Marine Corps, and to improve interoperability with its allies once the aircraft is fielded. 
The allied nations expect to acquire an advanced aircraft that they cannot afford to 
develop and produce on their own, to realize a return on their investment by bidding on 
the subcontracts, and to benefit from reaching aerospace technology and data.  
As mentioned in the U.S. DoD International Cooperation Handbook, international 
armaments cooperation is a complicated business and requires consideration of a series of 
complex national and international interrelationships. In addition to the intrinsic 
complexity of international cooperation, the inherent complexity of this ambitious and 
multifaceted project has resulted in a more complex JSF program, and has obligated the 
U.S. to implement an unprecedented acquisition strategy. The U.S. DoD’s new 
62 
 
acquisition strategy to develop and product JSF aircrafts first includes the allied nations’ 
participation in the program from inception of the concept development phase. No other 
countries or defense contractors have hitherto been invited or allowed to participate in a 
weapon or defense systems program from the concept development and design phase. 
Second, a best value acquisition strategy has been implemented for subcontracting, 
instead of traditional work share programs. Third, instead of coequal program 
participation, the program has developed a new partnership approach that requires 
participant nations’ commensurate representation, gives them influence in the program, 
and grants benefits dependent on their financial contributions. In these aspects, the JSF 
program is unique among the international cooperative armaments program; there are no 
other programs that can be used as a model for the JSF program.  
The U.S. DoD hopes that the JSF program’s unprecedented acquisition strategy 
establishes a model for prospective international cooperative acquisitions. Thus, the U.S. 
DoD and the JSF Program Office have envisioned that the JSF program will “be the 
model acquisition program for joint services and international cooperation to deliver to 
aircraft an affordable and effective next generation strike fighter weapon system and 
sustain it worldwide.”110 
This chapter analyzes the core objectives of the JSF program, international 
partners’ earlier involvement in the program, the best value acquisition approach, the 
leveled partnership strategy, affordability, and reasons for cost increase and schedule 
delays.  
A. INTERNATIONAL ARMAMENTS COOPERATION AND JSF 
PROGRAM 
1. The Objectives of the Multi-National Armaments Cooperation  
Over the past few decades, the increasing cost of new weapons systems led the 
U.S. and its allies’ policymakers to pursue collaborative international arrangements to 
                                                 





share the cost of development and production. In addition to reducing cost, international 
armaments cooperation programs have distinctive benefits such as providing 
interoperability between allied forces, providing greater political integration through 
shared training and doctrine,111 and enabling technology sharing.  
Current U.S. DoD policy112 highly promotes international cooperative 
acquisition, technology and logistics programs, projects, and activities with its allies. The 
U.S. DoD believes that international cooperative acquisitions enable the warfighter to be 
well prepared and supported for military operations, including coalition operations to 
defeat any adversary on any battlefield. Also, it is believed that well-constructed 
international cooperative agreements and programs strengthen the U.S. and its allies’ 
defense industrial base by providing reciprocal access to each other’s defense markets. 
The U.S. DoD International Armaments Cooperation Handbook states that establishing 
and maintaining cooperative relationships with allied nations is critical to achieving 
interoperability of equipment and services to be used by the armed forces of the United 
States and coalition partners. Furthermore, cooperative relationships are vital to achieving 
access to technology from sources worldwide, economies of scale, and expanding the 
U.S.’s influence in critical areas of the world. Accordingly, the U.S. International 
Armaments Cooperation policy strongly encourages the DoD to continue pursuit of 
international cooperative activities. DoD Directive 5000.1 thus states that all program 
managers shall pursue international armaments cooperation to the maximum extent 
feasible, consistent with sound business practice and with the overall political, economic, 
technological, and national security goals of the U.S.113  
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According to the U.S. DoD International Armaments Cooperation policy, the core 
objectives of armaments cooperation are categorized in five subgroups: operational, 
economical, technical, political, and industrial. Expected benefits from these core 
objectives are: 
• The Operational objective is to increase military effectiveness through 
interoperability and partnership with allies and coalition partners. 
• The Economic objective is to reduce weapons acquisition costs by 
sharing costs and economies of scale, and by avoiding duplication of development efforts 
with our allies and friends. 
• The Technical objective is to access the best defense technology 
worldwide and help minimize the capabilities gap with allies and coalition partners. 
• The Political objective is to strengthen alliances and relationships with 
other friendly countries.  
• The Industrial objective is to bolster domestic and allied defense 
industrial bases. After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. recognized that armaments 
cooperation programs offered new and broader opportunities for promoting U.S. security.  
2. The Objectives of the International Cooperative Acquisition of the 
JSF Program 
From the inception of the JSF program, the U.S. DoD has committed to design, 
develop, and produce JSF aircraft with its eight trusted allied nations in order to gain the 
benefits of the international armament cooperation. In 2003, Alfred G. Volkman, U.S. 
Director of the International Cooperation Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
(AT&L), articulated the reasons behind the JSF’s international cooperation strategy. In 
his view, the strategy would increase military effectiveness through standardization and 
interoperability and reduce weapons acquisition costs by avoiding duplication of 
development efforts with U.S. and its allies, as ruled by the U.S. DoD policy. In the 
hearing before Congress, he also stated that the ongoing JSF cooperative SDD phase 
activities with partner nations would accomplish the core objectives outlined in the 
International Armament Cooperation Handbook. There are four objectives of the JSF 
65 
 
program. The political/military objective is to enhance defense relationships with key 
allies. The economic objective is to decrease JSF program costs through partner 
contributions. The technical objective is to increase access to the best technologies of 
foreign partners. Finally, the operational objective is to improve mission capabilities 
through interoperability with allied forces in future coalition operations.114 
The JSF program’s international cooperative acquisition strategy’s core objectives 
are here analyzed in further detail. 
a. The Political/Military Objective 
The Political and Military objective of the JSF program is to enhance 
defense relationships among the U.S. and its key allies. In other words, the U.S. strives to 
tighten its relationship with its allies and have more powerful air forces to cooperate in 
future operations.  
According to the U.S. DoD’s International Armaments Cooperation 
Handbook, and as demonstrated in Figure 9, the highest achievement in armaments 
cooperation is cooperative research and development programs. The JSF program 
strongly promotes research and development issues; thus, the JSF program represents the 
highest level of international armaments cooperation, and the U.S. expects benefits 
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Figure 9. Hierarchy of Relationships Leading to Armaments Cooperation. Source: 
U.S. DoD International Armaments Cooperation Handbook, 6. 
The JSF program began in 1994, but most of the participating allied 
nations joined the program around 2002. The last aircraft will be delivered in 2034, and 
the F-35s will be in the service until 2064. Because of the JSF’s sophisticated acquisition 
strategy, which results in distribution of the production facility to nations all over the 
world, participant nations are obliged to retain involvement in the program during the life 
cycle of the aircraft, which is more than 60 years. Undoubtedly, the program will increase 
nations’ goodwill relationships and serve as an impetus to other defense cooperative 
acquisitions, but it will also decrease nations’ independence. An e-mail received on 
August 17, 2009 from the main contractors Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman 
mention that over one hundred defense subcontracts from different countries are working 
to develop and produce the JSF aircraft. Doubtlessly, one hundred subcontractors from 
various countries cause a complex subcontracting acquisition strategy and increase the 
participant nations’ dependability on each other. The nine allied nations must rely on 
each other in order to afford and support the F-35s. On the other hand, in political 
relationships, nations are allies only until their common interests clash. Since nation’s 
common interests can change in less than a decade, 60 year partnerships are politically 
optimistic.   
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As an example, in 1911 Turkey had a miserable experience involving 
political change and international partnerships. In that year, the Turkish government 
placed an order for two warships from the U.K. The warships, “Reşadiye” and “Sultan 
Osman,” were built by the U.K. in 1914. The Turkish government paid for the warships 
at a cost of 7.000.000 in gold, but on the last day of the contract the U.K. government 
refused delivery of the warships unless the Turkish government would agree to some 
political conditions. The resulting conflict continued between Turkey and the U.K. for 
many years.115  
Long term international cooperative acquisitions require stable and 
dedicated political relationships among allies. While there is no current instability among 
JSF participant nations, any major future instability among them can endanger the 
affordability of the aircraft, cause schedule delays, or affect the supportability of aircraft 
until a solution is found.   
b. The Economic Objective 
Allied nations participated in the program’s SDD phase in three levels and 
cumulatively contributed 4.5 billion dollars to the program, receiving commensurate 
benefits. The allied nations’ contribution represents 10.9 percent of total SDD funding. 
The U.K. is a level I partner and contributed 2 billion dollars, 45 percent of the eight 
allied nations’ contributions and almost five percent of the entire program. Italy and the 
Netherlands are level II, while Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Turkey are 
level III partners in the program. Allied nations’ financial contributions are shown in 
Table 9. 
To defray the costs of this affordable yet highly capable aircraft, the U.S. 
DoD has invited its allies to become program partners. Apart from the common desire to 
develop and field the aircraft, the U.S. and other allies have different expectations of the 
program.  
                                                 
115 Rifat Uçarol, Siyasi Tarih 1789–2001, (İstanbul: DER Yayınları, 2008), 566.  
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(1) U.S. Economic Objectives. The U.S. has two aims for the 
research and development (R&D) aspect. First, the U.S. does not want to fund technology 
which has already been developed by allied nations in consortiums to which the U.S. 
does not belong. The F-35B’s short take off technology, for instance, is already in use by 
the U.K., and the U.S. does not own the proprietary data. The technology is provided by 
the U.K. Secondly, the U.S. wants to share research and development costs with allied 
nations for innovative parts of aircraft. Allied nations have thus contributed 4.5 billion 
dollars, almost 11 percent of the SDD phase, to share these costs.  
Additionally, the U.S. wants to benefit from economies of scale by 
sharing fixed costs, thereby reducing costs in the long term. International participation to 
the JSF program provides significant benefits of the economies of scales. The program 
will produce 3173 aircraft before the year 2034, 2443 of them for the U.S. and 730 for the 
allied nations. The Allied nations will procure 23 percent of the manufactured aircraft. 
The agreement will provide benefits of economies of scale for the lead country, the U.S. 
Lastly, allied nations earlier involvement in the program creates a 
valuable market for the U.S. and the prime contractor. The U.S. lured the potential 
customer to contribute at the outset of the program. The participant nations adapted to the 
JSF program until 2006, developing an industrial relationship with the prime contractors 
and with the U.S. DoD. Then, in 2007, they committed to procure aircraft without 
accurate test results and current acquisition costs. Hence, the U.S. marketed 23 percent of 
the JSF aircraft before the project’s maturity. 
(2) Allied Nation’s Economic Objectives. All of the allied 
nations have noteworthy economic expectations of the JSF program. The U.S. DoD’s JSF 
International Industrial Participation Study116 shows that the Netherlands, Canada, 
Norway, and Turkey are primarily motivated by industrial, or economic, benefits. 
However, the U.K., Italy, Denmark, and Australia are primarily motivated by operational 
factors; they expect a return on their investment.  
                                                 
116 U.S. Department of Defense, JSF International Industrial Participation, .6. 
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The JSF program provides an opportunity for allied nations to 
realize a return on their investments by bidding competitively on the subcontracts. 
According to the DoD’s JSF International Industrial Participation study, the annually-
compounded return from the partners’ SDD investments range from 25 percent to over 
100 percent. This means that the participant nations will potentially earn between five 
and 40 dollars of revenue in return for every one dollar invested into the program, as 
shown in Table 11. While Canada’s dollar-for-dollar return is nearly twice that of the 
U.K. due to their relatively small partnership investment, the U.K.’s annually-
compounded rate of return is much higher due to the earlier timing of industrial 
revenues.117 
 
Table 11. Summary of Partner Country Return Potential. Source: U.S. DoD  
International Armaments Cooperation Handbook, 4. 
In addition to direct economic benefits, the JSF acquisition 
program provides indirect economic benefits to the participant nations. First, thanks to 
international armaments cooperation, the allied nations may become acquainted with the 
others’ defense industries and capabilities for prospective co-operations. Thus, the 
participant nations can find a market to sell or buy defense systems. For example, 
Turkey's TUSAS Engine Industry (TEI) first had a contract to manufacture parts for the 
General Electric F136 engine and the JSF power plant for Lockheed Martin. After 
                                                 
117 U.S. Department of Defense, JSF International Industrial Participation, .4. 
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successful production of TEI, it won a contract to provide design engineering and 
analysis for the F136 as well as other General Electric military and commercial engines. 
Later, GE awarded TEI a 700 million dollar manufacturing contract for commercial 
engine parts. 118 
Second, the JSF’s international cooperative acquisition strategy 
prevents wasted duplication of research, thus avoiding unnecessary development costs. If 
one nation wants to design and develop an aircraft alone, it must bear the entire burden of 
the program’s budget, including costly research and development and indirect and 
overhead costs. Conversely, the JSF’s acquisition strategy encourages nations to share the 
research and its cost.   
c. Technical Objective 
The technical objective of the JSF program is to increase access to the best 
technologies of allied partners. The U.S. DoD wants to decrease the cost of research and 
development by obtaining existing airspace technology from its allies. For example, F-
35B’s short takeoff and vertical landing technology and the lift fan system that powers 
the same U.S. Marine and U.K. variant are examples of technology that transferred from 
allied nations.119 On the allied nations’ side, the program is designed to offer participant 
nations the benefit of increased access to the programs and contractor information by 
virtue of their early participation in it,120 depending on their participation levels. 
However, GAO reports issued in 2003 (GAO-03-775) and in 2007 (GAO-07-360) show 
that the participant nations have not been satisfied with the shared data and technology.  
These reports point out the participant nations’ concerns about U.S. oriented technology 
transfer problems. The participant nations complained about the U.S.’s reluctance to 
share key technologies and some software codes. Some press reports have indicated that a 
                                                 
118 Lale Sariibrahimoglu, “Turkey’s TEI to make JSF Parts,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, Ankara, 
November 22, 2006. 
119 U.S. Congress. Senate, Hearing, Joint Strike Fighter International Cooperative Program, July 21, 
2003. 
120 U.S. General Accounting Office, Joint Cooperative Program Needs, GAO-O3-775, 12. 
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number of partner nations have threatened to withdraw from the program because of 
frustrations over work share and technology transfer issues.121 The British press has 
strongly criticized U.S. reluctance to provide key technologies, particularly the critical 
software codes, to Britain. At the beginning of 2006, the U.K. mentioned a potential 
withdraw from the program. On May 26, 2006, then-U.S. President George Bush and 
then-British Prime Minister Tony Blair issued a joint statement in Washington, resolving 
to iron out long-standing disagreements. “Both governments agree that the U.K. will have 
the ability to successfully operate, upgrade, employ, and maintain the Joint Strike Fighter 
such that the U.K. retains operational sovereignty over the aircraft,” the two leaders said 
in a statement.122 Technology sharing is the most frustrating and long-standing problem 
with the JSF program. The complexity of the high technology involved makes the 
technology transfer issues even more difficult. The JSF program consists of extremely 
complex aircraft technology, including 22.9 million lines of software programming 
(approximately 7.5 million lines are aircraft software code and the remainder is 
associated with logistics, training, and support systems).123 Recent evidence suggests that 
the U.S. DoD has developed an effective strategy to share technology with participant 
nations. Nevertheless, it is difficult to satisfy all nations that have contributed varying 
program funding amounts and are expecting significant technology transfers. The JSF 
program demonstrates that technology sharing will likely remain a problem for 
prospective international cooperative acquisitions unless nations have equally shared in 
the cost and technology. 
d. The Operational Objective 
The operational objective of the JSF program is to improve mission 
capabilities through interoperability with allied forces in future coalition operations. The 
                                                 
121 Ronald O’Rourke, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background, and Issues for Congress, 
CRS Report RL30563, (Washington DC: CRS, June 18, 2009), 9, 
http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30563.pdf. 
122 Jason Sherman, “U.S., U.K., Reach JSF Agreement,” InsideDefense.com, NewsStand, August 02, 
2006, http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,108100,00.html?ESRC=eb.nl. 
123 U.S. General Accounting Office, Joint Cooperative Program Needs, GAO-O3-775, 12. 
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JSF will increase interoperability124 through system commonality among allied air forces. 
Three version of the JSF fighter share a 70 to 90 percent common airframe to provide 
interoperability and to reduce production and maintenance costs.  
DoD 5000.1 defines the concept of interoperability: “Systems, units, and 
forces shall be able to provide and accept data, information, materiel, and services to and 
from other systems, units, and forces and shall effectively interoperate with other U.S. 
Forces and coalition partners.125”   
Similarly, U.S. Public Law 10 U.S.C 2457 states: “It is the policy of the 
United States to standardize equipment, including weapons systems, ammunition, and 
fuel, procured for the use of the armed forces of the United States stationed in Europe 
under the North Atlantic Treaty or at least to make that equipment interoperable with 
equipment of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”  
DoD 5000 series mentions interoperability as a major design consideration 
affecting the acquisition strategy, and stipulates that all acquired systems shall be 
interoperable with other U.S. and allied defense systems. Thus, the JSF program is 
designed and developed to exchange information, materiel, and services among the JSF 
operator air forces during future coalition operations.  
Interoperability is required by U.S. law and highly stressed by U.S. DoD 
policies. The JSF aircraft has been designed as an interoperable weapon system for the 
allied nations. Not surprisingly, as a result of their experiences in the Gulf War, the U.S. 
and the U.K. are two countries who have a focus on interoperability. Both countries know 
that the necessary synergy required to fight an enemy cannot be reached if coalition 
forces possess different systems and doctrines. According to a joint statement by 
                                                 
124 Lockheed Martin’s brochure about F-35s states: “Interoperability: In the battlespace of the future, 
information is power. The F-35 is the first fighter in history specifically designed to be a key net-enabling 
node in a system of systems – a lethal information gatherer and transmitter in a vast network of coalition 
assets. Its tremendous processing power, open architecture, powerful sensors, information fusion and 
flexible communications links make the F-35 an indispensable tool in future homeland defense and 
joint/coalition warfare and major combat operations.” Please see: 
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President Bush and Prime Minister Blair on May 26, 2006, both held "a shared view that 
we need to continue to strengthen and deepen the relationship between our defense 
establishments to achieve fully interoperable forces and to leverage the respective 
strengths of the U.S. and the U.K. industries."126 
3. Common Interests of the Allied Nations 
The common interests of the U.S. and eight participant nations are listed in the 
MOU of PSFD of the JSF program signed by the nations’ representatives. These common 
interests are: 
• Recognizing the benefits to be obtained from international cooperation 
regarding standardization, rationalization, and interoperability of military equipments; 
• Desiring to improve their mutual conventional defense capabilities 
through the application of emerging technology;  
• Desiring to cooperate in the production, sustainment, and follow-on 
development of the JSF to satisfy similar operational requirements; 
• Recognizing the benefits of continued cooperation within the JSF 
program, and seeking to capitalize on the lessons learned from their previous experiences 
in this and other international cooperative programs; 
• Seeking to establish a model for international cooperative acquisition 
programs; 
• Affirming their intent to use their best efforts to maximize the benefits of 
international cooperation; 
• Seeking to establish a robust vehicle of cooperation that will span the life 
cycle of the JSF Air System; 
                                                 




• Recognizing the importance of technological and industrial cooperation to 
the national security of all participants and seeking to reduce barriers to that cooperation 
between the participant; and 
• Recognizing that industrial participation will be an important parameter in 
the participants’ various national decision-making processes. 
As seen above, the common interests of the participant nations are derived from 
the program’s core objectives. Economic interests of the participant nations outweigh the 
other program objectives. For that reason, the JSF program can be seen as an economic 
cooperation rather than a political coalition seeking to establish a model for international 
cooperative acquisition programs, as promoted by the U.S. and eight allied nations.  
B. BEST VALUE ACQUISITION VERSUS OFFSET AGREEMENTS 
One of the unprecedented features of the JSF acquisition strategy is the best value 
acquisition approach.127 Jon A. Schreiber, ex-Director of the JSF International Program, 
defines best value as “one of the major tenets of this program which allows for fair and 
open competition in the globe marketplace.” The JSF PSFD MOU defines best value as 
“maximizing affordability consistent with broader project objectives.” GAO reports 
expound upon this understanding, defining best value as a “competitive approach which 
does not guarantee foreign or domestic suppliers a predetermined level of work based on 
country’s financial contribution to the program.” Implementing a best value approach 
means moving away from traditional offset agreements and developing completely new, 
more competitive acquisition strategies for the JSF acquisition and prospective 
cooperative acquisitions.  
According to the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, offsets in defense trade 
are industrial compensation practices required as a condition of purchase in either 
government-to-government or commercial sales of defense articles and/or defense 
                                                 
127 Best value defined here and at the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is not same. FAR 
describes best value as “the expected outcome of an acquisition that, in the government’s estimation, 
provides the greatest overall benefit in response to the requirement.”  
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services as specified in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Offset agreements 
are commercial contracts between a defense firm and a foreign government.128 Offset 
activities can take many forms; they might be directly related to the purchased defense 
system and related services, or they might involve activities or goods unrelated to the 
defense system. Developed countries with established defense industries use offsets to 
channel work or technology to their domestic defense companies. Countries with newly 
industrialized economies are utilizing both military and commercial related offsets that 
involve the transfer of technology and know-how.129 
Offset agreements in international trade became ubiquitous in sales of 
technologically advanced equipment in the late 1960s and early 1970s.130 These 
agreements have also served in important foreign policy and national security objectives 
of the U.S., such as increasing the industrial capabilities of allied countries, standardizing 
military equipment, and modernizing allied forces.131 However, the U.S. government’s 
current policy on offsets in defense trade states that the government considers offsets to 
be “economically inefficient and trade distorting,” and prohibits any agency of the U.S. 
government from encouraging, entering directly into, or committing U.S. firms to any 
offset arrangement in connection with the sale of defense articles or services to foreign 
governments.132 
A report prepared for the U.S. Congress by the U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security articulates the forces behind changes in policy regarding offset agreements:  
                                                 
128 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Offsets in Defense Trade, Fifth 
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129 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Impact of Offsets in Defense 
Trade: an Annual Report to Congress, 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/defenseindustrialbaseprograms/osies/offsets/default.htm. 
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Defense export sales are an important component of U.S. defense 
contractors’ revenues and to U.S. foreign policy and economic interests. 
Exports of major defense systems help lower overhead costs to the DoD 
on common defense programs and help maintain production facilities and 
workforce expertise for current and future U.S. defense requirements. 
Exports also provide additional business to many U.S. subcontractors and 
lower-tier suppliers, promote interoperability of defense systems between 
the United States and friends and allies, and contribute positively to U.S. 
international trade account balances. However, when an offset agreement 
requires a high proportion of subcontracting, co-production, licensed 
production, or purchases, it can negate some of the economic and 
industrial base benefits accrued through the defense export sale. U.S. 
defense subcontractors and suppliers, and in some cases portions of the 
prime contractor’s business, may also be displaced by offset 
transactions.133 
The U.S. government contends that offset agreements should largely be limited to 
short, build-to-print production runs for a limited quantity of aircraft.134 Offset 
agreements are not suitable for complex acquisitions such as the JSF program, which 
requires a high proportion of subcontracting and broad allied nations’ participation. 
To avoid the drawbacks of offset agreements, the U.S. DoD proposed the best 
value acquisition approach for the JSF program. A best value acquisition approach, 
unlike offset agreements, does not guarantee any agreements between the U.S. and 
participant nations for predetermined work share on the JSF program based on a nation’s 
financial contribution to the program. Rather, the approach requires competition among 
the nine participant nations’ defense industries to reach best value. GAO reports state that 
the U.S. DoD and the JSF Program Office expect that using a competitive contracting 
approach, without prescribed work share for partner countries, will also assist in 
controlling JSF costs. The U.S. DoD’s history with cooperative programs, such as the 
                                                 
133 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Offsets in Defense Trade, 
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Army’s Medium Extended Air Defense System,135 have experienced cost and schedule 
problems because such programs focused on meeting industrial work share requirements 
rather than pursuing a cost-effective acquisition strategy. Another example of 
coproduction programs employing traditional work share programs, the F-16 
Multinational Fighter Program, often experienced cost premiums to the program in terms 
of increased manufacturing costs associated with use of foreign suppliers. In contrast, the 
JSF program’s acquisition approach is expected to award contracts to the most 
competitive suppliers.136  
However, to compete on the JSF’s high technology aerospace subcontracts, each 
participant nation must be competitive enough to bid on the subcontract. The best value 
approach requires that competitive nations belonging to a sound defense industry have 
the resources to compete with others. Were participant nations unable to compete with 
the others, it might cause problems among the allied nations that could affect the success 
of the program. 
Finally, the best value acquisition strategy is designed to replace traditional offset 
agreements which are considered economically inefficient for complex contracts such as 
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and transportable. It will be capable of countering tactical ballistic missiles and air-breathing threats, 
including cruise missiles. (Taken from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/meads.htm). 








JSF Sourcing Based on Best Value 
 
Figure 10. JSF Sourcing on Best Value. Source: Loys Gray, “F-35 International 
Support Equipment Briefing,” 22, 23, 24 May 2007, 
www.lockheedmartin.com. 
C. PARTICIPATION LEVELS  
Another unprecedented feature of the JSF program is the allied nations’ 
participation timing and levels. The nations involved in the program began participation 
at the inception of the program, starting with the U.K.’s commitment in 1995. Previous 
aircraft programs, such as the F-16 program, did not have participant nations’ 
involvement until the later phases137 and were driven by offset agreements. Co-
productive nations did not contribute to the design or development of the program. 
Unlike previous international cooperative acquisitions, earlier involvement in the JSF 
program gives more leverage to the participant nations in contributing to the design and 
                                                 
137 Schreiber, “JSF International Business Strategy”, NATO’s Nations and Partner for Peace, 165. 
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aircraft qualifications, and provides insight into the program development and associated 
costs.  Thus, participant nations become bigger stakeholders in the program.  
The JSF program has three phases: the concept demonstration phase, the system 
development and demonstration phase, and the production, sustainment, and follow on 
development phase. During the concept development phase, the U.K. was the only full 
cooperative partner, level I, by virtue of a 200 million dollar contribution to the program. 
The U.K. is entitled to full program and structural data, and has the ability to influence 
aircraft design and performance characteristics. Level II partners include Denmark, the 
Netherlands, and Norway, investing 30 million dollars each. Their contributions entitle 
them to limited program data and requirement design. Level III partners, Canada and 
Italy, each funded 10 million dollars in the JSF program. They are entitled to limited 
access to program information and representation, but have no influence on requirements. 
Level IV partners include Turkey (which paid 6.2 million dollars138), Singapore, and 
Israel; these nations are entitled to negotiate the cost, performance, and model of the 
aircraft. Australia did not participate in this phase. At this phase, the nations had 
influence on the program based on their financial contributions.  
The second phase is the SDD phase, which began in 2001 and will continue 
through 2012. At the SDD phase, the allied nations cumulatively contributed 4.5 billion 
dollars, 10.9 percent of the SDD funding, for the JSF program at the three levels of 
partnership arrangements. The corresponding benefits include airspace technology 
transfer, insight into the design and development process, and membership on 
management decision-making bodies dependent on their financial contributions. (Figure 
11 details participation levels and average investment amounts.) Industry to industry 
relationships begin at the SDD phase, and the participant nations’ defense companies can 
bid on the prime contractor’s subcontracts. This phase is the most important phase in 
establishing sound relationships among participant nations, prime contractors, and 
participant nation’s defense industries. Undoubtedly, a cooperative relationship will 
                                                 




enhance the success of the program and will affect the program’s affordability. At the 
SDD phase, the participant nations can withdraw from the program without financial 
punishment. Hence, to keep them in the program, the JSF should work to satisfy 
participant nations regarding program efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
Figure 11. JSF SDD Phase International Participation. Source: Schreiber, JSF 
International Business Strategy, NATO’s Nations and Partner for Peace, 
166. 
The last and longest phase is the PSFD phase. It will cover the entire service life 
of the F-35 aircraft, beginning from the first production. This phase offers no distinction 
in participation level; participant nations announce their commitment to acquire a certain 
quantity of aircraft according to a pre-established time schedule. If a participant nation 
decided to withdraw its commitment to purchase the aircraft after participation in this 
phase, the country could be penalized financially. Unlike the SDD phase, the cost is here 
divided on a fair share basis determined by the contribution of each nation. Also, unlike 
the SDD phase, the PSFD phase is an agreement among all partner nations.  
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The JSF program’s commensurate participation approach is serves as a valuable 
model for prospective international cooperative acquisitions. The approach grants 
benefits according to investment. But commensurate participation does not prohibit 
competitive bids on the subcontracts; there are no proportionality restrictions on the 
subcontract.  
D. AFFORDABILITY 
Affordability is a pillar and highly advantageous characteristic of the JSF 
program. The Web page of the JSF program strongly emphasizes the program’s vision as 
“delivering and sustaining the most advanced, affordable strike fighter aircraft to protect 
future generations worldwide.”139 To develop an advanced but affordable aircraft, several 
new acquisition approaches have been implemented in the JSF program, such as 
comprehensive international participation, the best value acquisition approach, the 
production of common three version aircraft, and technology transfer from allied nations.  
Several program, design, and technical changes have rendered the original JSF 
business case beyond execution,140 and have resulted in significant cost increases and 
schedule delays. Since the inception of the SDD phase in October 2001, the average 
program unit cost has grown by over 50 percent. In addition to the cost increase, full rate 
production of the first JSFs to the warfighter has been delayed by 2.5 years. Opponents 
liken the program to the failed F-22A program because of its substantial cost increases, 
schedule delays, reduced number of planned aircraft,141 and immature technology. These 
problems have created concern about the health of the program among the U.S. public 
and partner nations.   
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140 U.S. Government Accounting Office. Opportunity to Reduce Risks, GAO-05-271, 1. 
141 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Tactical Aircraft: Recapitalization Goals Are Not 
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Since 2005, the GAO has leveled steady criticism at the JSF for departing from 
the DoD policy preference that calls for adopting an evolutionary approach to 
acquisitions. The GAO’s findings for cost increase and schedule delays can be listed as 
follows: 
• Lack of a knowledge-based evolutionary acquisition approach, 
• Concurrence of design, development, testing and manufacturing, 
• Heavy Investment in production before testing has demonstrated 
acceptable performance of the aircraft, and 
• Procurement of a quantum leap aircraft under cost reimbursement type 
contracts without 100 percent flight test results.  
GAO reports issued since 2005 express concerns that the program’s acquisition 
strategy does not fully follow the intent of DoD’s evolutionary, knowledge-based 
acquisition policy that is based on best practices.142 A knowledge-based, evolutionary 
business case for the product requires that developers  
• Make a clear description existing needs, 
• Ensure that resources are available to develop a product that will meet the 
need, 
• Determine that the product developer has a knowledge-based plan and 
strategy to deliver the product,  
• Establish reasonable estimates for cost, delivery time, and quantities, and 
• Secure available funding for the product.143 
However, instead of following a knowledge-based evolutionary acquisition 
approach, the program began to concurrently develop the JSF technologies, integrate and 
demonstrate the expected product design, and manufacture aircraft. This approach carries 
a high level of risk.144  
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The current JSF’s acquisition strategy requires the purchase of 383 aircraft at a 
cost of 54.3 billion dollars for the U.S. DoD (for details see Figure 5 in Chapter II), and 
184 aircraft at a cost of approximately 26.09 billion dollars145 for international partner 
nations (for details see Table 5 in Chapter II). The strategy ultimately requires a total 
purchase of 567 aircraft at a cost of 80.39 billion dollars before flight test programming is 
fully completed in 2014. To achieve the planned LRIP phase, the U.S. DoD must make 
significant investments in tooling, facilities, and personnel before testing is completed in 
2014. This investment is made without enough test results demonstrating that 
• The aircraft’s flying qualities function within the parameters of the flight 
envelope (that is, the set limits for altitude, speed, and angles of attack), 
• The aircraft design is reliable, or  
• A fully integrated and capable aircraft system can perform as intended.146 
Starting production without mature design and technology or without all flight 
test results significantly increases risk of costly design changes that will push the 
program over budget and behind schedule.147 In other words, problems discovered late in 
flight testing could cause further cost increases, changes in manufacturing process, 
schedule delays or late delivery, and reduced quantity and reliability.148 Figure 12, 
prepared by the GAO, is a notional illustration showing the impact of a highly concurrent 
acquisition strategy relative to a less concurrent strategy that captures key design and 
manufacturing data before production begins.149 
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Figure 12. Notional Illustration Showing the Different Paths That JSF Development 
Can Take. Source: GAO Report, GAO-07-360, 17. 
Another criticism regarding affordability is that the uncertainties in the program 
may negatively affect cost effectiveness. The JSF acquisition strategy assumes the use of 
a cost-reimbursement type contract for initial production, placing a high risk burden on 
the government during the early production phase.150 According to FAR Part 16.301, 
cost-reimbursement types of contracts provide for payment of allowable incurred costs to 
the extent prescribed in the contract. Cost-reimbursement contracts are suitable for use 
only when uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be 
estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract. As seen in 
Figure 13, cost-reimbursement contracts for weapon production are considered 
appropriate when the program lacks sufficient knowledge about system design, 
manufacturing processes, and testing results to establish firm prices and delivery dates. 
Buth with cost-reimbursement contracts, as evidenced in the JSF program, a greater cost 
                                                 
150 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Opportunity to Reduce Risks, GAO-05-271, .3. 
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risk is placed on the buyer, in this case the U.S. DoD and partner nations. In contrast, a 
fixed-price contract provides for a pre-established price, places more of the risk and 
responsibility for costs on the contractor, and provides more incentive for efficient and 
economical performance.151  
 
Figure 13. Risk Continuum for Contracts Types. Source: Elliot Cory Yoder, “Cost 
and Price Analysis Lecture” Cost and Price Analysis & Negotiations 
Course, NPS, Monterey, CA, July 2009. 
Under its current strategy (see Figure 5), the U.S. DoD will switch from a cost-
reimbursement contract to a fixed-price contract after 2013. In 2013, a total of 362 
aircraft will have been produced for the U.S. and partner nations (see Table 5). That 
means 11.4 percent of entire production will be manufactured under a cost-
reimbursement contract. Thus, the significant financial risk will be shared by the U.S. and 
partner nations’ governments. Consequently, the uncertainties inherent in concurrently 
developing, testing, and producing the JSF aircraft prevent the pricing of initial 
production orders on a fixed-price basis.152 
                                                 
151 U.S. Government Accounting Office,  Accelerating Procurement, GAO-09-303, 13. 
152 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Recapitalization Goals Are Not Supported by 
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The GAO believes that cost increases and schedule delays are a result of the U.S. 
DoD’s concurrent design, development, testing, and production processes. The GAO 
therefore recommends that JSF institute a knowledge-based evolutionary acquisition 
strategy for an affordable and on-time aircraft:  
A key to successful product development is the formulation of a business 
case that matches requirements with resources—proven technologies, 
sufficient engineering capabilities, time, and funding—when undertaking 
a new product development. First, the user’s needs must be accurately 
defined, alternative approaches to satisfying these needs properly 
analyzed, and quantities needed for the chosen system must be well 
understood. The developed product must be producible at a cost that 
matches the users’ expectations and budgetary resources. Finally, the 
developer must have the resources to design and deliver the product with 
the features that the customer wants and to deliver it when it is needed.153 
E. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. and eight international partners gathered to design, develop, and produce 
a fifth generation aircraft for use by various services such as the Air Force, Marine Corps, 
and Navy. Allied nations were also drawn to participation by the promise of opportunities 
to exchange technology and information among the cooperative nations, and to gain 
technological, economic, political, and operational benefits.  
The core objectives of the JSF program touch four specific areas. These are 
political/military, economic, technological, and operational objectives. The 
political/military objective is to enhance defense relationships with key allies. However, 
the life cycle time for the JSF program is more than 60 years. So, to successfully reach 
the political objective, the participant nations must have stable relationships. Otherwise, 
compromised alliances might affect the program’s core focuses of affordability and 
supportability.  
The economic objective is to decrease JSF program costs by virtue of partner 
contributions. So far, the allied nations have contributed 4.5 billion dollars to the 
program. They directly and proportionally benefit from the program’s technology sharing 
                                                 
153 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Opportunity to Reduce Risks, GAO-05-271, 6. 
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and program’s control. They also benefit indirectly by granting visibility to their 
aerospace companies, increasing the likelihood of future cooperative programs.  
The technical objective is to increase access to the best technologies of foreign 
partners. The U.S. benefits from technology previously developed by allied nations. The 
allied nations gain access to the program’s newly developed technology in proportion to 
their investment.  
The operational objective is to improve mission capabilities in future coalition 
operations through interoperability within the allied forces. The F-35s will make allied 
nations’ aircraft compatible with each other for future operations.   
In order to develop this complicated aircraft, the U.S. DoD has implemented an 
unprecedented acquisition strategy and envisaged that this innovative strategy will be a 
model for all prospective international cooperative acquisitions. The best value strategy, 
international partners earlier involved to the program, and leveled program participation 
are significant features of the JSF program acquisition strategy.   
The best value approach will replace offset agreements for complicated defense 
system and weapons programs such as the F-35 program. An inventive alternative to 
traditional work share programs, it does not guarantee any work share for partner nations. 
This approach requires that partner nations bid competitively to win the contracts. Partner 
nations should possess relatively equal technological capabilities in order to create a 
competitive environment. 
Leveled partnership provides participant nations leveled benefits and a voice in 
the program commensurate with their investments. It prevents those participant nations 
with reduced investments from having an equal share in decisions that can affect the 
entire program. 
In spite of all efforts and unprecedented approaches, the program’s unit cost has 
increased 50 percent since the outset of the SDD phase, and the schedule has been 
delayed by 2.5 years. GAO reports express the reasons for cost increase and schedule 
delays in terms of the U.S. DoD’s departure from a knowledge-based evolutionary 
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acquisition approach and a reliance on the concurrency of design, development, testing, 
and production phases.  These two features create uncertainties which prevent the 
program from the switch from cost-reimbursement contracts to fixed-cost contracts.   
In light of these problems, the GAO recommends that the U.S. DoD use a 
knowledge-based evolutionary acquisition approach before committing resources to new 
product development. It advises that the DoD gather evidence that (1) the Warfighter’s 
needs are valid and can best be met with the chosen concept and quantities, and that (2) 
the chosen concept can be developed and produced using existing resources—that is, 
proven technologies, design knowledge, adequate funding, and adequate time to deliver 
the needed product. 
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IV. TURKEY AND THE JSF PROGRAM 
The significant military threat which was prominent in Cold War period 
has been replaced by the growing security problems such as terrorism 
called asymmetrical threat, religious fundamentalism, widespread use of 
weapons of mass destruction, illegal migration movements, sharing of 
scarce water resources. Due to its geopolitical position, our country is at a 
location where the problems mentioned above have been occurred.  To 
overcome all these security issues having strong military forces is essential 
for our country.154 
General Hasan Aksay 
Turkish General Staff War Colleges Commander 
A. TURKEY’S PARTICIPATION IN THE JSF PROGRAM 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey has been looking for a new aircraft to 
replace its F-16 and F-4 aircraft, which are scheduled to leave service around 2012 to 
2015. In 1999, Turkey participated in the JSF program’s concept development phase by 
contributing 6.2 million dollars as a level IV, foreign military sale partner. In 2002, 
Turkey participated in the JSF SDD phase, paying 175 million dollars as a level III 
partner.  
Before the end of 2006, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Britain, the Eurofighter group, 
invited Turkey several times to participate in the Eurofighter Typhoon program.155 In 
2006, before Turkey’s sponsorship in the JSF PSDF phase, the Eurofighter group 
proposed to Turkey an “equal partnership with equal voting rights as other member 
nations have” and a nine billion dollars work share for its local defense industry if the 
Turkish government committed to buying 120 fighters. Six billion dollars of work share 
would be allocated for an 80 aircraft purchase and 3.2 billion dollars of work share 
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earmarked for a purchase of 40 aircraft. The group pledged to deliver the first batch of 
aircraft by 2010. The group also offered Turkey access to source codes and other critical 
technologies, an enhancement package, full access to repair capabilities for the aircraft, 
and the authority to use the aircraft anywhere, at any time in line with Turkish military 
doctrine.156  
However, despite the Eurofighter group’s advantageous offer, Turkey selected the 
U.S.-led JSF program over Europe’s Eurofighter Typhoon. Turkey chose the JSF 
program because officials felt that the aircraft provided the most value at the lowest 
cost.157 Then, at the beginning of 2007, Turkey participated in the JSF PSFD phase by 
committing to purchase 100 F-35A CTOV at a cost of around 10 billion dollars at the 
2007-value. The Turkish Air Forces will field the first F-35 in 2012 and the last aircraft 
in 2021. 
B. TURKEY’S EXPECTATIONS OF THE JSF PROGRAM 
According to the U.S. DoD’s JSF International Industry Participation analysis, 
there are two primary reasons why Turkey participated in the JSF program. The first 
motivation is the positive effect on industry in terms of increased revenues, jobs, and 
technological expertise. The second motivation is the upcoming need to replace existing, 
aging fighter aircraft. 
At the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding of JSF SDD in 2002, 
Turkish Minister of National Defense, Mr. M.VECDÎ GÖNÜL, stated Turkey’s 
expectations:  
This program will be a very good opportunity for us to contribute to 
protecting the global peace as well as improving our national security. We 
will also benefit from a state-of-the-art technology and the affordability-
based cooperative production and sustainment. On top of that, this 
program will create a comprehensive tool to accelerate the existing good-
faith relationship between the two strategic allies in a variety of 
                                                 
156 TDN Defense Desk, “Eurofighter Offers Turkey $9 Billion Local Work,” The Turkish Daily 
News, November 30, 2006, http://gbulten.ssm.gov.tr/arsiv/2006/11/30/01.htm. 
157 U.S. Department of Defense, JSF International Industrial Participation, .69. 
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cooperative areas. For this reason, Turkey has been fully supporting and 
participating in all cooperative efforts within the early CDP and SDD 
phases of the program since 1999. We will be attaching a government-
level concentration and allocating a significant amount of national 
resources throughout the Program.  
Turkey is the country with the lowest national income per capita among 
participant countries of JSF Program. It is also worth mentioning that, the 
good-faith cooperation to be pursued among the governments of the 
partner nations in this program will inherently be extended to our 
industries also, as to create a sound basis for a reliable business 
relationship.158 
As stated by the Turkish Ministry of National Defense, the Turkish Government 
sees the JSF program as an opportunity to improve its defense industry and to benefit 
from a cooperative acquisition through technology transfer and a good-faith relationship. 
Turkey expects substantial financial, political, and technological returns in addition to 
obtaining an affordable advanced technology aircraft that the country could not afford to 
develop on its own. As mentioned in the DoD’s JSF International Industrial Participation 
Study, Turkey’s economic expectations outweigh other concerns. An e-mail to the author 
on June 05, 2009 from Turkish Undersecretariat for Defence Industries states that 
Turkey’s ultimate target for industrial return is at least 50 percent of the program’s total 
acquisition cost, with approximately 30 percent return on investment. Currently, Turkish 
Defense Industry contractors are competitively bidding on the program’s subcontracts.  
Turkey’s expectations of the JSF program can be summarized as follows: 
• To benefit from state-of-the-art technology, 
• To obtain affordable aircraft, 
• To improve a good-faith relationship between the two strategic allies, 
• To bid on subcontracts on a best value basis to capture at least 50 percent 
of the acquisition cost, and 
• To create a sound basis for a reliable business relationship. 
 
                                                 
158Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı, Türkiye, Müşterek Taarruz Uçağı (JSF) Projesi Üretim Evresi’ne 
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C. TURKEY’S PROCUREMENT PLAN AND AFFORDABILITY 
In 2007, Turkey committed to buy 100 F-35A CTOL aircraft. The F-35 
procurement will begin in 2012 and continue until 2021, initially at a rate of 10 aircraft 
per year for the first three years, followed by 12 per year during 2015-2016, and reverting 
to 10 per year in 2017-2020, with the final six to be funded in 2021. Turkey’s F-35 
procurement plan and expected cost are shown in Table 12. 
Turkey’s F-35 Procurement Plan and Expected Cost 

















2001 to 2007) 
2012 10 81.00 810.00 121.60 1,216.00 406.00 
2013 10 81.00 810.00 121.60 1,216.00 406.00 
2014 10 81.00 810.00 121.60 1,216.00 406.00 
2015 12 81.00 972.00 121.60 1,459.20 487.20 
2016 12 81.00 972.00 121.60 1,459.20 487.20 
2017 10 81.00 810.00 121.60 1,216.00 406.00 
2018 10 81.00 810.00 121.60 1,216.00 406.00 
2019 10 81.00 810.00 121.60 1,216.00 406.00 
2020 10 81.00 810.00 121.60 1,216.00 406.00 
2021 6 81.00 486.00 121.60 729.60 243.60 
Total 100  8,100.00  12,160.00 4,060.00 
 
Table 12. Turkey’s F-35 Procurement Plan and Expected Cost. 
Like all participant nations, Turkey has been suffering from the JSF program’s 
cost increase. As mentioned earlier, affordability was one of the dominant factors in 
Turkey’s decision to participate in the program. As seen in Table 12, at the time when 
Turkey participated in the JSF program, the estimated cost of procurement was 196 
billion dollars for 2,886 aircraft, which equates to a program acquisition unit cost 
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(PAUC) of 81 million dollars per aircraft. The average procurement cost (APUC) (which 
does not include R&D or other costs) was estimated at 69 million dollars per aircraft in 
2001.  
However, the U.S. DoD’s SAR of September 2008 estimated the JSF program 
acquisition at 298.8 billion dollars for 2,456 aircraft, which equates to a PAUC of 121.6 
million dollars per aircraft. The APUC is estimated at 103.9 million dollars per aircraft. 
The December 2007 PAUC and APUC cost estimates are, respectively, 50.1 percent and 
50.5 percent higher than cost estimates made in October 2001. Thus, the program’s cost 
for 100 F-35 at 8.1 billion dollars increased to 12.16 billion dollars in seven years, up 
until September 2008. Nonetheless, a GAO report issued in May 2009 points out that the 
JSF development acquisition cost will continue to increase, and will cost more and take 
longer to complete than reported in 2008 due to the contract cost overruns and extended 
time needed to complete flight testing.159 
The program’s cost increase forced Turkish Undersecretariat Defence Industry to 
seek more subcontracts. In 2002, Turkey’s industrial return aim was at least 50 percent of 
8.1 billion dollars, that is, slightly more than four billion dollars. But in seven years, the 
program cost increased 12.16 million dollars, and Turkey’s industrial return expectation 
increased to at least 6 billion dollars. Over these years, the Turkish defense industry 
contractors diligently worked to win subcontracts. 
D. TURKEY’S INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION 
Before participation in the JSF program, the Turkish Government critically 
assessed the pros and cons of the program. Although it had a lucrative offer from the 
Eurofighter Group, Turkey chose the JSF program. However, the JSF’s best value 
approach was a big concern for the Turkey Defense Industry. The JSF international 
cooperative acquisition approach, unlike the F-16 offset agreement, required a highly 
competitive approach rather than a guaranteed work share. Turkey had made a tough 
decision. The Eurofighter Group had guaranteed a 9 billion dollar work share in return 
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for a commitment to purchase 120 Typhoon.  By participating in the JSF program, they 
were volunteering to compete with aerospace giants such as BAE, Goodrich, and Smiths 
Aerospace from the U.K.; ASE SPA, Fiat Avio, and Galileo Aviance from Italy; Philips 
Aerospace and SP Space from the Netherlands; Magellen, Pratt&Whitney Canada, and 
Casabank Technologies from Canada; Volvo Aero from Norway; and many highly 
competitive aerospace companies from the U.S. and other participant nations.   
The years between 2002 and 2004 were tough years for the Turkish Defense 
Industry because they could not compete on subcontracts. In fact, Turkish officials 
believed that they were not informed of the complete spectrum of available JSF contracts. 
After 2005, the Turkish Defense Industry contractors began to compete on the program 
subcontracts. According to an e-mail received by author from the Turkish 
Undersecretariat for Defence Industries states that nine Turkish companies, including 
Aselsan, TUSAS Aerospace Industries (TAI), and the privately owned KaleKalip, had 
acquired about 7 billion dollars worth of work on the JSF program as of June 2009. As 
part of this, Northrop Grumman and TAI of Turkey signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) for F-
35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter work that could be worth up to three billion dollars 
over the next 20 years. The LoI, signed in February 2007, will allow TAI to become a 
second source production centre for a minimum of 400 centre fuselage sections.160 In 
2008, TAI opened a new advanced composites manufacturing production facility in 
Ankara for the JSF program. Currently, Turkish Defense Industry contractors are 
working on a wide range of JSF components, and they are expecting to bid on more 





                                                 
160 The same information can be found at:, “Venturing out: Turkey Country Briefing, FEATURES”, 




Contract Definition Contractor Turkish Subcontractor
IPT Participation - Autolog, Life Cycle LM IS Havelsan 
MRIU Chassis, Card Stiffeners, Card Assy Smiths Ayesas 
AME Pylons Marvin TAI 
Collaborative Door Uplocks Heroux-Devtek KaleKalip 
STOVL sm machined parts LM Aero KaleKalip 
Fluid Delivery System Precision Mechined 
Components Eaton Kalekalıp 
Machining CTOL/STOVL/CV 
Small/Medium/Large Al&Ti Parts LM Aero Kalekalıp 
IPT Participation    BAE SYSTEMS- Operations TAI 
Machining-Wing/Fwd Small/Medium Parts LM Aero Kalekalıp 
Landing Gear Parts Manuf. Phase 1 Goodrich LG Alp 
EHAS Transfer Tubes Parker Controls Alp 
Canopy Hinge Sleeve Assy Production and 
Assembly LM Aero Alp 
Interoperability Analysis LM Milsoft 
Structural Parts NG ST Kalekalıp 
Power Conditioning Electronics NG ST MiKES 
Crash Survivable Memory Unit Assembly L3 Comm Ayesas 
Panoramic Display L3 Comm Ayesas 
MRIU Production Tooling and Test Smiths Ayesas 
MRIU Production  Smiths Ayesas 
Center Fuselage LRIP composites NGC TAI 
CAIC* Module Production NGMS Aselsan 
EW Components & Assemblies BAE IEWS Mikes 
Center Fuselage Assembly and Parts NG TAI 
Rear/ Hub P&W  Alp 
Integrated Bladed Rotor Production P&W Alp 
Rotating Engine Parts GE TEI 
Blisk Spool Production GE TEI 
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Shrouds P&W Kalekalip 
Seals P&W Kalekalip 
Rotating& Complex Engine Parts GE TEI 
 
Table 13. Turkish Companies’ Subcontracting for the JSF program. Source: Turkish 
Undersecretariat for Defence Industries, (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı.) 
As mentioned before, Turkey’s projected industrial return is at least 50 percent of 
program acquisition cost, with 30 percent return on investment. To date, Turkish defense 
companies have been awarded seven billion dollars worth of JSF contract work, that is, 
57.6 percent of the total acquisition cost. The expected return on the investment amount, 
30 percent of seven billion dollars, is 2.1 billion dollars. Turkish companies have already 
reached their goal and are looking for additional financial and technological benefits from 
the JSF Program. The Turkish Undersecretariat for Defence Industries is satisfied with 
the amount of the subcontracts and looking to realize more benefits. 
The Turkish government perceives the JSF program as a premier aerospace 
league in which the best aviation contractors gather to develop and produce JSF aircraft. 
It is important to gain industrial and technological benefits beside economic and 
political/military benefits. The Turkish Defense Industry wants to garner prestige by 
winning subcontracts to produce advance technology aircraft. Competing with advanced 
aerospace companies will strengthen domestic industry and prepare Turkish companies 
for prospective competitive contracts. By establishing good relationships and 
demonstrating defense industry capabilities, Turkey believes that it will increase 
opportunities to capture more contracts for future projects. Also, thanks to the JSF 
contract, Turkey is developing its Defense Industry’s infrastructure and creating new job 
opportunities via JSF contracts. For example, in 2008, TAI opened a facility to produce 
advance composites for F-35 fuselages in Ankara. This new facility will result in new 
contracts and more jobs. Thus, as mentioned by the Turkish Minister of National 
Defense, Turkey sees the JSF contract as an opportunity to capture industrial, economic, 




Turkey participated in the JSF program to procure affordable F-35s with 
substantial economic, technological, and industrial returns. Currently, it has reached 57.6 
percent of its industrial return. Turkey wants to benefit from technology transfers and 
establish good relationships for prospective cooperative contracts.  
However, beyond the benefits that have been thus far realized, the Turkish 
government should analyze the JSF’s international cooperative acquisition strategy. 
Turkey has numerous cooperative agreements with several countries to design or produce 
a wide range of defense weapons or systems. The best value acquisition and leveled 
program participation approaches are good initiatives for future Turkey-led international 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. CONCLUSION 
In addition to being the largest and most expensive international armaments 
cooperation, the JSF program is also the most complex and ambitious aircraft acquisition 
program among the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, 
Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Norway. The program’s purpose is to develop and field 
a supersonic, highly common family of stealthy, next-generation strike fighter aircraft for 
the U.S. Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. 
Over the past few decades, the increasing need for new weapons systems, 
requirements of interoperability among the allied nations, and the necessity to share 
technology and information in order to develop advanced aircraft all led the U.S. and its 
allies to pursue collaborative international arrangements. The JSF program officially 
began in 1994, and allied nations began participation in the program between 1994 and 
2002. While the program is led by the U.S., all participant nations cooperate to design, 
develop, and produce an affordable yet advanced technology aircraft by exchanging 
technology and information and investing in the program with commensurate benefits. As 
a result, the allied nations will gain an advanced aircraft that they could not afford to 
develop and produce on their own, a return on their investment through work on 
competitively awarded subcontracts, and benefits from shared aerospace technology and 
data.  
The complexity of such an operation required an unprecedented international 
cooperative acquisition strategy. Furthermore, the U.S. DoD and the JSF Program Office 
envisioned the program to “be the model acquisition program for joint services and 
international cooperation to deliver to aircraft an affordable and effective next generation 
strike fighter weapon system and sustain it worldwide.” However, the program’s cost 
increases, schedule delays, and significant design modifications have created debates 
about the health of the program over the years. Officials are questioning whether the 
program’s untried acquisition strategy can serve as a model for prospective acquisitions.  
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From the outset of the program, JSF was considered to be an international 
cooperative acquisition program with four core objectives: political/military, economic, 
technological, and operational.  
The political/military objective of the program is to enhance defense and political 
relationships among participant allied nations. However, the life cycle time of the JSF 
program is more than 60 years. History shows that the nation’s common interests can 
change in less than a decade, so a 60-year partnership is politically too optimistic. To 
reach the political objective, the participant nations must have a goodwill and stable 
political relationship. Otherwise, negative relationships may affect the program’s core 
focuses of affordability and supportability. Despite this drawback, the program is 
considered to have improved nations’ political and defense relationships and likely will 
be a pioneer for future defense cooperative acquisitions. While the cooperative 
agreements among the participant nations have increased global defense partnerships, 
they will also decreases nations’ independence. With one hundred defense companies 
from nine participant nations producing parts for the program, the political objectives of 
JSF make the participant nations dependent upon each other for a substantial amount of 
time. 
The economic objective of the program is to reduce the JSF program’s research 
and development costs through contributions from partners, and to reap the benefits of 
economies of scales. The allied nations have in total contributed 4.5 billion dollars to the 
program for the SSD phase. Thus, the U.S. reduces R&D costs by spreading costs among 
participant nations. The allied nations’ earlier commitment to purchase untested and 
unproduced aircraft creates a valuable market for the U.S. defense industry. The U.S. 
defense industry further benefits from the economies of scales by producing 730 aircraft 
for allied nations in addition to 2443 aircraft for U.S. services. On the other hand, allied 
nations benefit from the program’s technology sharing and program’s control in 
proportion to their contribution. The partner nations’ defense industrial companies bid on 
the subcontracts to provide a best value acquisition base. They have the opportunity to 
capture five dollars to 40 dollars of revenue in return for every one dollar invested in the 
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program. Moreover, by participating in the JSF program, partner nations become familiar 
with the U.S. aerospace defense industry processes, increase their technical 
competencies, and increase their likelihood of being awarded additional work in the 
future. For these reasons, the economic objective of the program outweighs the other 
program objectives, and on this basis, the JSF program is viewed as an economic 
cooperation rather than a political coalition among the U.S. and eight allied nations. 
The technical objective of the program is to increase access to the cutting edge 
technologies of foreign partners and to share the program’s technology with participant 
nations, depending on their investment. The U.S. benefits from advanced technology 
which the allied nations have already developed. For example, the U.S. benefited from 
allies’ technology by acquiring short takeoff and vertical landing technology and the lift 
fan system that powers the F-35B STOVL. The allied nations benefit from the JSF 
program’s newly developed technology in accordance with their investment. However, 
the participant nations are not satisfied with the shared data and technology. Some 
nations complain that the U.S. is reluctant to share software codes and key technologies. 
Technology sharing is the most frustrating and long-standing problem with the JSF 
program.  The complexity of the cutting edge technology makes the technology transfer 
issues even more difficult. To date, it is evident that the U.S. DoD has developed an 
effective strategy to share technology with the participant nations. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to satisfy all nations that have contributed varying program funding amounts and 
are expecting significant technology transfers. Hence, the JSF program demonstrates that 
technology sharing remains a problem area for prospective international cooperative 
acquisitions. To address this problematic issue, programs should include at their 
inception a clear understanding and agreement as to the kinds of technology to be shared 
at each level of participation. Then nations will invest on a commensurate returns basis 
and avoid technology share problems.  
The operational objective of the program is to improve mission capabilities in 
future coalition operations through interoperability with the allied forces. Interoperability 
is the policy of the U.S. to standardize equipment (including weapons systems,) 
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ammunition, and fuel procured for the use of the armed forces of the U.S. stationed in 
Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or at least to ensure that 
the equipment is interoperable with equipment of other members of NATO. The F-35s 
will make allied nations’ aircraft compatible with each other for future operations. 
Interoperability is an objective of the U.S. and the U.K., but will also provide great 
benefits in future cooperative operations involving other nations. 
In order to realize this complicated aircraft design, development, and production 
program, the U.S. DoD implemented an unprecedented acquisition strategy and 
envisioned that this innovative strategy would be a model for the future international 
cooperative acquisition programs. The best value strategy, international partners’ earlier 
involvement to the program, and leveled program participation are significant features of 
the JSF program’s acquisition strategy. 
The best value approach replaces offset agreements for complicated defense 
systems and weapons such as the F-35 program. The U.S. government believes that offset 
agreements are appropriate for short, non-complex productions with a limited production 
quantity. However, the U.S. government believes that offset agreements are not suitable 
for complex acquisitions such as the JSF program, which requires a high proportion of 
subcontracting and broad allied nations’ participation. To avoid the drawbacks of offset 
agreements, the U.S. DoD brought forward the best value acquisition approach for the 
JSF program. Unlike previous traditional work share programs, it does not guarantee any 
work share for partner nations. This approach requires that partner nations bid 
competitively to win the contracts. To foster successful competitive bidding on contracts, 
partner nations should possess relatively equal technological capabilities. If there are no 
technological discrepancies among participant nations and they are thus highly 
competitive, a subcontract can be awarded on a best value basis and the acquisition 
strategy becomes a good model for future acquisitions.  
Another unprecedented feature of the JSF program is the allied nations’ 
participation timing and participation levels. Unlike previous cooperative armaments 
programs, the partner nations were granted an opportunity for involvement during the 
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concept phase of the program. Earlier involvement in the program gives more leverage to 
the participant nations in contributing to the design and aircraft qualifications, and 
provides insight into the program development and associated costs. Thus, participant 
nations become greater stakeholders in the program. The JSF program’s commensurate 
participation approach serves as a valuable model for prospective international 
cooperative acquisitions. This approach grants nations benefit in proportion the their 
contributions. Furthermore, the approach provides participants nations leveled benefits 
and a voice in the program commensurate with their investments It prevents those 
participant nations with reduced investments from having an equal share in decisions that 
can affect the entire program. Moreover, commensurate participation does not prohibit 
competitive bids on the subcontracts; there are no proportionality restrictions on the 
subcontracts.  
In spite of JSF’s innovative approaches, the program’s unit cost has increased by 
50 percent since the outset of the SDD phase, and the schedule has been delayed by 2.5 
years. GAO reports have expressed the reasons for cost increase and schedule delays in 
terms of the U.S. DoD’s departure from a knowledge-based evolutionary acquisition 
approach and a reliance on the concurrency of design, development, testing, and 
production phases. These two features create uncertainties that prevent the program from 
migrating from cost-reimbursement contracts to fixed-price contracts. So, instead of 
prime contractors, the U.S. government partner nations assume the program risk for 362 
aircraft, 11.4 percent of the entire production. 
GAO reports recommend that the U.S. DoD use a knowledge-based evolutionary 
acquisition approach before committing resources to new product development. The 
GAO advises that the DoD gather evidence that (1) the Warfighter’s needs are valid and 
can best be met with the chosen concept and quantities, and that (2) the chosen concept 
can be developed and produced using existing resources—that is, proven technologies, 
design knowledge, adequate funding, and adequate time to deliver the needed product. 
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JSF’s contribution to future acquisitions will become clearer with time. The JSF 
program’s acquisition strategy may indeed serve as a model if the program meets the 
conditions proposed by this MBA project:   
 
• The participant nations should have a goodwill and stable relationship 
over the long term in order to sustain affordability and sustainment of the aircraft. 
• For long term political partnerships, the partner nations’ governments, 
defense industries, congresses, and public should be determined and eager for 
cooperation.  
• Technology share levels should be determined at the inception of the 
program to prevent potential technology sharing problems such as those of the JSF 
program.  
• All participant nations should possess relatively equal technological 
capabilities, and all participant nations should be highly capable of competitive bidding 
on subcontracts.  
• The JSF program’s commensurate participation approach should be 
implemented for future cooperative agreements. The approach provides participant 
nations leveled benefits and a voice in the program commensurate with their investments. 
It prevents those participant nations with reduced investments from having an equal share 
in decisions that can affect the entire program. 
• In order to provide more realistic cost estimates, JSF leaders should 
implement a knowledge-based evolutionary acquisition approach before committing 
resources to new product development.  
• JSF leaders should avoid concurrent design, development, testing, and 
production processes requiring significant investment without adequate testing results. 
Chapter IV analyzes Turkey’s participation in the JSF program. As mentioned in 
that chapter, despite the Eurofighter group’s advantageous offer, Turkey participated in 
the JSF program to procure affordable F-35s with substantial economic, technological, 
and industrial returns. Turkey selected the U.S.-led JSF program over Europe’s 
Eurofighter Typhoon because it felt that JSF provided the best value at the lowest cost. 
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Turkey’s expected industrial return is at least 50 percent of the program 
acquisition cost, with a 30 percent return on their investment. To date, Turkish defense 
companies have been awarded seven billion dollars in contracts, that is, 57.6 percent of 
the total acquisition cost. The expected return on the investment amount, 30 percent of 
seven billion dollars, is 2.1 billion dollars. Turkish companies have reached their goal and 
are looking for more financial and technological benefits from the JSF Program. But the 
program’s constant cost increases have forced Turkish companies to competitively bid on 
subcontracts in order to reduce the cost of aircraft by increasing their rate of return. 
Industrial participation is extremely important for the Turkish defense industry. 
The Turkish government perceives the JSF program as an premier aerospace league in 
which the best aerospace contractors gather to develop and produce the JSF aircraft. The 
Turkish Defense Industry wants to garner prestige by winning the subcontracts to 
produce advanced technology aircraft. Competing with advanced aerospace companies 
will strengthen its domestic industry and prepare it for participation in other competitive 
contracts. By working with nine countries on the JSF program, the Turkish government 
gains familiarity with allied nations’ aerospace industry manufacturing processes, 
increases its technical competencies, and increases its likelihood of being awarded 
additional work in the future. Moreover, the JSF contract has allowed Turkey to develop 
its Defense Industry’s infrastructure and to create new job opportunities for the Turkish 
people via JSF contracts. For example, in 2008, TAI opened a facility in Ankara to 
produce advance composites for F-35 fuselages. A new facility will generate new jobs 
and new contracts. Thus, as mentioned by Turkish Minister of National Defense, Turkey 
sees the JSF contract as an opportunity to capture industrial, economic, and technological 
benefits. 
However, regardless of the benefits reaped thus far, the Turkish government 
should analyze the JSF’s international cooperative acquisition strategy. Turkey has 
numerous cooperative agreements with several countries to design or produce a wide 
range of defense weapons or systems. The best value acquisition and leveled program 





This MBA project analyzes only one aspect of the JSF program, international 
cooperative acquisition. Rather than providing a case-by-case examination of participant 
nations, the project looks broadly at the overall program, dedicating one chapter to the 
author’s home country, Turkey.  Further research may add greater understanding of the 
JSF program and its contributions to prospective acquisition projects. First, research 
might analyze the industrial participation of international companies. Questions regarding 
the percentage of JSF work being subcontracted to international companies are 
considered proprietary and were answered by Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. 
If the JSF program later discloses international partners’ industrial participation data, 
such as subcontracting percentages and dollar values, research might address the 
efficiency of the best value acquisition strategy.     
Second, additional research might analyze the benefits and liabilities of each 
nation resulting from the JSF program’s international cooperative acquisition strategy, 
with a particular focus on the benefits and liabilities of the U.S. 
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